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INTRODUCTION 
Family firms form the majority of organizations around the world (Burkart, Panunzi, & 
Shleifer, 2003). However, only few survive beyond the first generation (Poza, 2007). 
Traditionally, intergenerational succession has been equated to the success of a family firm. 
Passing the firm on to children was always regarded as the central task. This fact is mirrored in 
the family business literature with succession being the most researched domain. However, very 
little has been said about succession routes alternative to intergenerational transfer (Goosens, 
Manigart & Meuleman, 2008, Scholes, Wright, Westhead, Burrows, & Bruining, 2007; Vought, 
Baker, & Smith, 2008). The view that handing over the family firm to the children is the only 
way to go appears somewhat limited and distant from the reality. Indeed, family business owners 
often use the term “pass along” to mean both transferring ownership to the next generation and 
selling the firm to pass along the wealth created by the business (Vought et al., 2008). In effect, 
some families want and can be passed on to multiple generations, while others may be unwilling 
or unable to do so. Empirical research suggested that some owners may perceive that there are no 
suitable family members to whom ownership and leadership can be transferred (Wright, 
Thompson, & Robbie, 1992; Bierly, Ng, & Godfrey, 1999).  Accordingly, for some business 
families an exit can be a positive choice (Birley et al., 1999). Consequently, more research is 
needed that would recognize a sale as a viable option for a family firm and cover this and other 
alternative succession routes. 
The thesis focuses on an alternative succession route for family businesses, i.e. sale, with 
a particular emphasis on valuation and acquirers’ perception of family firm targets. In order to 
cope with the research objective, I implemented a variety of methods, some of which have never 
been employed in previous family business studies. 
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The research is divided into the following three chapters, each one corresponding to a 
paper: 
1. Measures of Value in Acquisitions: Family Versus Non-Family Businesses 
2. Family Firms in the Eyes of Private Equity Companies 
3. Family Firms – Risky Acquisition Targets? 
The first one has been submitted to a refereed journal and is in the final stage of peer 
review (three submissions in total). To present the second paper I was invited to an international 
conference on ownership transfer in privately-held businesses in Stockholm, Sweden. The third 
paper and in part also the second one are a result of a research period at The Wharton School, 
University of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, USA), financed by the Swiss National Science 
Foundation. Three different datasets have been used for every paper. All the data was collected 
by me exclusively for the purpose of the doctoral thesis and current or future publications, based 
on the thesis materials. 
The focus of the first paper is to compare valuations of privately-held family versus non-
family business targets in the acquisition context. Our main finding is that although most 
theoretical and empirical research explicitly recognize the prevalence and superior performance 
of family businesses around the world, acquirers are unable to recognize the advantages 
associated with family businesses and thus acquire them at a discount as compared to non-family 
business counterparts. 
The second and third papers analyze the perception of family firm targets by an important 
class of acquirers, private equity firms. The second paper has an exploratory character and was 
meant to lay the ground for the overlooked topic of family firm acquisitions and in particular to 
examine this topic from the acquirers’ perspective. We found that one half of the private equity 
professionals surveyed flag the fact that a potential acquisition target is a family firm, but only for 
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a third this difference would translate into valuation, mostly a discount. To some extent, this is 
explained by the higher risk attributed to family firm targets. We also noted that private equity 
professionals may equate family firms to small businesses. 
Findings from the second paper underlie the questionnaire constructed for the third paper 
that studies private equity firms’ attitude towards family firm target in more detail. Here it is 
noted that family firm targets are indeed perceived to be riskier by their acquirers and that this 
can have negative influence on the valuation. Other measures to coop with higher riskiness are 
discussed such as a more intensive usage of risk-mitigating measures, as well as a different 
structuring of the deal. It is concluded that the perception of risk, even though not always 
corresponding to the actual levels of risk, influences investors’ behavior. 
On the following pages, a summary of all the three papers is presented. This first part is 
closed with a brief conclusion and a short bibliography. 
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SUMMARY 
Chapter 1: Measures of Value in Acquisitions: Family Versus Non-Family Businesses 
Darya Granata and Francesco Chirico 
 
Submitted to the Family Business Review (first submission July 31st, 2009; currently in the final 
round of the review process) 
Presented at the IFERA (International Family Enterprise Research Academy) conference  in 
Limassol, Cyprus, June 24th- 27th, 2009. Initial draft presented at the IFERA conference in 
Breukelen, The Netherlands, July 2nd-5th, 2008. 
 
The increasingly rapid change in the current business environment and the need for novel 
solutions often motivate firms to expand their resources through acquisitions (Makri, Hitt & 
Lane, forthcoming). Acquisition is a unique form of entrepreneurship activity through which a 
company (acquirer) acquires another company (target) (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson & Ireland, 
1991). In the latter half of the 20th century, acquisitions became a prominent strategy for many 
companies, large and small, to acquire complementary resources (Harrison et al., 1991). Since, 
their strategic use to acquire new resources has become a well institutionalized corporate 
phenomenon (Uhlenbruck, Hitt & Semadeni, 2006), primarily because acquisition targets provide 
opportunities for organizational learning by exposing the acquirer to new and diverse ideas, 
thereby overcoming resource based constrains to growth (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1990). 
However, while acquisition has received considerable research attention in the strategic 
management literature (e.g. Harrison et al., 1991), and although family businesses are the most 
common form of organizations throughout the world,  accounting for over 75% of all registered 
companies in most economies (Miller, Steier & Le Breton-Miller, 2003), only few recent studies 
have focused on family business’ acquisitions (Basu, Dimitrova & Paeglis, 2009; Caprio, Croci 
& Del Giudice, 2008; Holmen & Nivorozhkin, 2007; Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2010; 
Mickelson & Worley, 2003; Steen & Welch, 2006). A family business is defined as an 
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organization in which a family has a substantial ownership stake, and has at least two of its 
members in key management positions (see Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester & Cannella, 2007; 
Westhead & Cowling, 1998; Zahra, Neubaum & Larraneta, 2007). 
A central issue in any acquisition is the valuation of the target company by the acquirer – 
a measure that determines the price to be paid for acquisition (i.e. acquire at a discount or 
premium). Surprisingly, none of the aforementioned family-business studies compared valuation 
of privately-held family business targets with non-family business targets. Our empirical research 
attempts to fill this gap in the family-business literature, thus suggesting important implications 
for research and practice. Two major views have been constructed regarding the nature of family 
businesses: stagnation vs. stewardship (Miller, Le Breton-Miller & Scholnick, 2008). The 
stagnation perspective proposes that family organizations face unique challenges to growth and 
expansion mainly because of resource restrictions. Alternatively, the stewardship perspective 
suggests that family members view themselves as stewards of the family business, and thus 
nurture it for the support of future generations through stewardship over the continuity of 
business, employees, and customer relationships. This enables family businesses to perform 
better than non-family businesses. Miller et al. (2008)’s findings fully substantiate the 
stewardship perspective but not the stagnation perspective (see also Anderson & Reeb, 2003). 
Building on the above-arguments, we argue that although most theoretical and empirical 
research explicitly recognize the prevalence and superior performance of family businesses 
around the world (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Astrachan & Shanker, 2003; Koiranen & Chirico, 
2006; Miller et al., 2008; Sharma, 2004), acquirers tend to regard  family business as an 
unprofessional and inefficient organization in which decision-making processes are driven by 
emotions rather than by economic rationality (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson & 
Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). Hence, acquirers are unable to recognize the advantages associated with 
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family businesses and thus, are disposed to pay a lower price (i.e. acquire at a discount) for a 
family business target than for a non-family business target. The negative consequence for the 
family business target is evident: it gets less money than it is worth. Meanwhile, the acquirer, 
who underestimates the family business target’s value,  risks losing valuable investment 
opportunities when the family-business target is not willing to sell at a lower price. We believe 
that a focus on family businesses may both advance knowledge on the evaluation of target firms 
and help us understand specifically why acquiring companies tend to pay a discount price for 
family business targets as compared to non-family business targets. 
The potential insights that can be gained by addressing evaluation issues in acquisitions 
from a family perspective result from the unique and distinguished features of family when 
compared to non-family businesses. Tangible and intangible resources are indeed unique in a 
family business since they result from interactions between the family, its individual members, 
and the business (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). The family business is the only organization in which 
family members are simultaneously active in the family and the business, hence significantly 
influencing business performance (Chirico & Salvato, 2008). When the target company is a 
family business whose economic value stems not only from the business but also from the family, 
evaluating such business can become quite complex. Thus, this form of organization requires a 
detailed examination from both the family and business’ aspects at the time of acquisition. 
However, acquirers generally tend to focus their attention on the negative aspects of a family 
business. In their eyes, stagnation drawbacks prevail over stewardship advantages, thus 
underestimating its real value. 
We explore the overlooked topic of valuing family businesses within the context of 
acquisition, using a unique dataset of privately-held family and non-family business targets. 
Given that the valuation of both privately-held family and non-family businesses is a difficult and 
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often highly subjective process, especially because a privately-held company has no observable 
stock price to serve as an objective measure of market value, we relied on valuations from recent 
acquisitions. We employed a matched-pairs method for statistical analysis, and the standard 
technique of multiples as measures of value (see Alouche, Amann, Jaussaud & Kurashina, 2008; 
Koeplin, Sarin & Shapiro, 2000). We note the absence of multiples in previous family business 
literature. Overall, our empirical analysis confirms that acquiring companies are unable to 
recognize the advantages associated with a family business target compared to a non-family 
business target, and consequently, pay less (i.e. acquire at a discount) for a family business. 
Accordingly, we offer practical implications for potential family business targets as well as their 
acquirers. 
 
Chapter 2: Family Firms in the Eyes of Private Equity Companies 
Darya Granata and Patrizia Gazzola 
 
Presented at the “Transfer of Ownership in Private Businesses – European Experiences”, an 
international conference on the current research, policies and practices related to transfer of 
ownership Stockholm, Sweden, March 25th – 26th, 2010. 
Presented as a working paper at the IFERA (International Family Enterprise Research Academy) 
conference  in Limassol, Cyprus, June 24th- 27th, 2009. 
 
Succession is probably the most challenging task in family firms and hence it is the oldest 
and the most researched domain in the family firm academia. This topic continued to be prevalent 
throughout the whole history of the family firm academic research, i.e. the last thirty years 
(Chittoor & Das, 2007). However, very little has been said about succession routes alternative to 
the transfer to the next generation (Goosens, Manigart & Meuleman, 2008). The ownership 
transfer can take different forms such as sale to a strategic or a financial buyer, management 
buyout or buy-in and initial public offering (IPO). In this paper we address the issue of family 
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firm succession outside the family and particularly devote our attention to a highly important 
class of acquirers such as private equity firms. The Centre for Management Buy-out and Private 
Equity Research revealed that 38% of European buyouts in 2007 were targeting family firms 
(CMBOR, 2007) and that 62% of family businesses are acquired by private equity investors 
according (Bytestart website, 2008). Despite the fact that there is a considerable amount of 
practitioner literature on private equity, it is a relatively new topic in academia (Bargeron, 
Schlingemann, Stulz, & Zutter, 2008). Even less developed is the academic research on private 
equity in family firms. It was described as being still in its infancy (Achleitner Schraml, & 
Tappeiner, 2008). The few studies of private equity investments in family firms (e.g. Achleitner 
et al., 2008; Howorth, Westhead & Wright, 2004) focused on family firm motivations and the 
deal process. The most similar to the current study is research by Dawson (2009) who examined 
decision-making models used by Italian private equity investors in their selection of family firms. 
Our study however deals with a broader range of family firm attributes that was possible thanks 
to not restraining private equity respondents to a predefined set of characteristics. 
The purpose of this study was to determine how investors perceive family firm targets and 
whether this perception translates into money terms, i.e. if the fact that a target is a family firm 
has an influence on its valuation. A major contribution of this article is that it explicitly assesses 
what picture of family firms do private equity firms have and whether there are any consequences 
for the valuation. 
We believe that the topic of family firm succession is highly important and that there is a 
burning need to close the gap in the literature. From the theoretical point of view, it is important 
for the following reason. Family business academia and family firms themselves recognize their 
distinctiveness. But what about third parties, in particular investors, do they perceive family firms 
as a separate class of companies and what characteristics do they attribute to family firms? From 
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the practitioners’ point of view, understanding private equity firm perception of family firms can 
benefit both sides. Acquirers can benchmark attitude towards family firms and be better prepared 
to handle family firm investments. Family firms can understand acquirers’ perception, address 
weaknesses and potentially achieve a higher valuation. This issue has been ignored not only from 
the family firm scholars, but also from private equity scholars who focus their attention on large 
public-to-private transaction leaving the family buyout part understudied (Cumming, Siegel & 
Wright, 2007). Dawson (2009) argued that private equity professionals among others use family 
firm specific criteria. However, there were no previous studies of what these criteria are and we 
did not believe that it was possible to create an exhaustive list of family firm characteristics when 
these firms are in the role of an investment target. What we wanted to achieve was a picture of 
family firms drawn by the companies that routinely analyze numerous privately-held family firm 
targets. In general terms, rather than testing a hypothesis about reality, we were looking to make a 
statement about how actors interpret reality (Suddaby, 2006). Consequently, our work is 
organized in the form of a qualitative study and has rather an exploratory character. We 
employed the content analysis technique to analyze the last question concerning family firm 
characteristics and adopted a four-stage interpretive approach to the manual classification of 
open-ended responses suggested by Taber (1991). 
A survey was conducted from October to December 2008 and included the whole 
population of private equity firms that have acquired Western-European companies in the last 
eight years and were covered by the Mergermarket database. The study is based on 14 phone 
interviews and 140 written responses and was followed up with 5 face-to-face and 1 phone expert 
interviews. 
Results from this research revealed that one half of the private equity professionals we 
have surveyed flag the fact that a potential acquisition target is a family firm. Only for a third 
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however this difference would translate into valuation. The ones that would value a family firm 
differently lean towards negative valuation and to some extent, this is explained by the higher 
risk attributed to family firm targets. Other characteristics suggest that private equity 
professionals may equate family firms to small businesses. Finally, most of family firm 
weaknesses correspond to the measures that private equity firms usually undertake. 
Consequently, the shortcomings of family firms may be overcome through the active 
management and represent an untapped potential. Scholes, Wright, Westhead, Bruining, & 
Kloeckner (2009) confirm this proposition. 
We hope that our findings and conclusions will inspire new studies on private equity 
investments in family firms, as well as other alternative succession routes. For decades, we have 
been well-served by studies of succession that focus on the passing the firm to the next 
generation. Yet succession takes other forms and, given the large amount of families exiting their 
business, this topic warrants further conceptual and empirical analysis. We also believe that our 
study contributes to the understanding of family firm perception by third parties and that further 
research on how external groups such as investors and customers view this unique type of 
organization is justified. 
 
Chapter 3: Family Firms – Risky Acquisition Targets? 
Darya Granata 
 
Result of the research period at The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 
USA), financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation. 
 
Although traditionally family firm literature was almost exclusively dedicated to the topic 
of intra-family succession and was seeing a sale of a family firm as a failure, finally we can find 
some academic researchers arguing that both keeping and selling the business could be viable 
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success options for business families (Dana & Smyrnios, 2010). In fact, a high number of 
families around the world is actually considering to sell (Halter, Schrettle, & Baldegger, 2009; 
Gow, 2007; Smyrnios & Dana, 2006, 2007).  
This chapter reports a study of private equity professionals’ attitude towards family firm 
targets and is one of the very few articles trying to understand acquirers’ perception of family 
firms. The objectives of the study were threefold. First, it was intended to further develop the 
qualitative findings from an exploratory study on family firm targets’ perception by private 
equity firms (Chapter 2) that was aimed to open up a discussion about family firms as acquisition 
targets. The most prominent characteristic from the previous chapter was higher riskiness of the 
family firm targets. Consequently, a major attention was given to the exploration of this trait, as 
well as better understanding of its consequences and mitigating measures private equity firms 
employ. Second, it is hoped that the results will provide members of the private equity 
community, as well as other financial and strategic acquirers, with an aggregate picture of family 
firms and in particular outline risks associated with this type of targets. Finally, this study should 
help selling families pinpoint their weaknesses, take the steps necessary to improve them and 
consequently be able to negotiate a higher valuation. 
The questionnaire was based on the findings from the chapter two of this thesis. The 
survey instrument consisted of 13 major questions relating to various family firm targets’ risks, 
risk-mitigating measures, valuation, investment process and familiarity with the family firm 
targets. Answers were measured using a 7-point Likert-type rating scale. 
The study was organized in the following steps. In-depth face-to-face discussion of the 
initial draft of the questionnaire with eight experts served a twofold purpose. First, I wanted to 
examine if respondents understood all the items in the way I meant them to be understood. 
Second, experts suggested additional items. Although, all the suggestions were very valuable, I 
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only stuck to additional items that corresponded to the purpose of the research. The following 
individuals were involved as experts: two private equity professionals, one consultant to private 
equity firms, two family business and one entrepreneurship professors, one private equity post-
doc researcher, as well as one professional survey consultant. The questionnaire was then pilot 
tested in two stages. In the first stage, testing was performed with nine PhD and post-doc 
students. This time rather than using face-to-face communication, I asked them to fill out 
questionnaire in the electronic form, the media that I was going to use for the final study. 
Doctoral and post-doctoral students’ comments mostly concerned wording and scale issues and 
were critical for the final development of the questionnaire. The scale items were then reworded 
based on their feedback and distributed to the participants of the last testing stage that included 
23 undergraduate and MBA participants of the family business course at The Wharton School. 
This step gave me a glance of what the results may look like in the actual study. In addition, final 
version was tested for the time expense. The responses from both pilot tests were not included in 
the final analyses. 
Electronic survey was chosen for the sake of convenience for the private equity 
professionals, as well as for its several attractive features such as easy data management, location 
flexibility, and rapid diffusion. 
The whole population of the US-American buyout firms listed on the Private Equity Info 
website was considered for this study. Questionnaire was sent to 1,018 e-mail addresses, however 
the adjusted number of population to whom enquiries were sent is 879 (considering impersonal 
addresses, failed emails and refusals). Only fully administered questionnaires were considered for 
the analysis. 145 fully filled out questionnaires resulted in the response rate of 14.2% (16.5% if 
the adjusted number of the total population is considered). MANOVA tests revealed that sample 
 18 
selection bias was not an issue in this study (Kanuk & Berenson, 1975; Sharma, Chrisman, & 
Chua, 2003). 
Private equity professionals rather agree than disagree that family firm acquisition targets 
bear higher risk than their non-family counterparts. The two most important risk types are 
management transition risk and culture transition risk. Both of them also have the two lowest 
standard deviations meaning that there was quite a high level of agreement among survey 
participants. Open-ended question revealed several additional family firm targets’ risks such as 
risks concerning family dynamics and lack of trust for the private equity investors. 
Due diligence for dynamics of relationship and team followed by financial due diligence 
seem to be the most important risk-mitigating measures undertaken by the private equity 
investors. Among the three contractual procedures, earn-out provision seems to be the least 
important when dealing with family firms. High perceived riskiness of family firms is associated 
with greater reliance on different types of due diligence. In fact, the higher the perceived risk, the 
more checks are necessary. 
Almost all the risk-mitigating measures are positively and statistically significantly 
correlated with each other. This can be interpreted in the following way: private equity 
professionals who tend to think some measure is more important in family firm transactions 
generally tend to think so about several of the measures. One of the crucial measures mentioned 
in the open-ended question was a non-compete agreement. 
Higher riskiness of family firm investments is negatively correlated with the valuation. 
This means that private equity professionals perceiving family firms as riskier targets look to 
mitigate for this with the price. Adjusting for higher risk can also be handled with various risk-
mitigating measures discussed above. In addition, one of the respondents mentioned that the 
discount can also be in terms of structure. The private equity professional mentioned that he or 
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she would always want the family to own a stake in the business junior to his or her securities. 
These answers to the question about reasons for a discount or a premium revealed that the main 
reasons for a discount are the need to replace management and the lack of infrastructure. Reasons 
for a premium, mentioned by a tiny number of respondents, were connected to a higher upside 
potential. It can be argued however that the realization of the upside potential is a merit of private 
equity professionals and has its costs. Consequently, it is questionable if acquirers should pay a 
premium for such a target. 
Private equity professionals who perceive family firms as higher risk investments are also 
those for whom the investment period is longer. Family firm is an entity that comprises both 
family and business matters. Consequently, with twice as many issues to be analyzed due to 
higher riskiness the sale process takes longer.  
Familiarity with family firms is not correlated with perception of family firms as riskier 
targets, neither is it correlated with any of risk types. A possible interpretation is that family firms 
are generally perceived as riskier targets and this perception is not dependent on the amount of 
experience of private equity professionals with this type of firms.  
Cluster analysis was meant to reveal whether there are any broad types of private equity 
professionals, with common attitude towards family firm targets. A two cluster solution was 
adopted. The first cluster includes private equity professionals who perceive family business risks 
to be higher and consequently see more need in risk-reducing measures and assign lower 
valuation to family businesses. They are also the ones who are undecided whether family firms 
are turnaround situations versus the second group who somewhat disagrees with this. Process 
length and familiarity with family firms are the same for both clusters. 
In order to explore whether there was a more general pattern underlying the responses of 
private equity professionals, the data was factor analyzed. In addition to the Eigenvalue-greater-
 20 
than-one rule, the scree test was employed to double-check the number of factors (Tucker, 
Koopman, & Linn, 1969). Analysis of risk types revealed that the risk that owners back out of 
transaction stands out from other types. This risk type can be hardly mitigated with any of the 
measures that were included in the survey. In addition, it relates more than others to transaction 
itself rather than to target characteristics. Examination of risk-mitigating measures also resulted 
in two factors. Factor one is associated with a concern of preventing negative issues that can be 
identified through different kinds of due diligence pre-buyout or mitigated with an escrow 
account post-buyout. Factor two relates to stimulating collaboration from sellers’ side. Through 
an earn-out and a minority stake sellers should become interested that a company performs well 
post-buyout.  
Perhaps the most important finding from this study is that family firm targets are indeed 
perceived to be riskier by their acquirers and that this can have negative influence on the 
valuation. In addition, higher perceived risk was connected with a more intensive usage of risk-
mitigating measures, and a different structuring of the deal (junior versus senior securities) was 
suggested. Consequently, the perception of risk, even though it may be different from the actual 
levels of risk, influences investors’ behavior. 
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CONCLUSIONS  
The first paper found a discount for a family firm in the acquisition context 
notwithstanding the majority of theoretical and empirical research explicitly recognizes the 
prevalence and superior performance of family businesses around the world. We proposed that 
acquiring companies tend to regard family businesses as unprofessional and low-performing 
organizations, thus negatively affecting their valuation as compared to non-family business 
targets. We outlined harmful effects for both sides in the transaction. 
The last two papers proposed in this thesis have analyzed more in depth how acquirers 
regard family firm targets and what can be a real reason for valuing them lower than their non-
family peers. The main conclusion was that there is a higher risk involved in acquiring a family 
firm. For the same amount of return, a riskier asset should be priced lower, so private equity 
firms (and probably other acquirers as well) essentially adjust for a higher risk with price. 
Additional tools to handle higher perceived risk were found to be certain contractual provisions 
and pre-buyout checks, as well as a different structuring of the deal. 
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Abstract: The present article sheds light on the valuation of family firms compared to non-
family firms as acquisition targets. We argue that although the majority of theoretical and 
empirical research explicitly recognizes the prevalence and superior performance of family firms 
around the world, acquiring companies tend to regard family firms as unprofessional and 
inefficient organizations, thus negatively affecting their valuation as compared to non-family firm 
targets. Overall, our empirical analysis, based on a matched-pairs methodology and use of 
multiples, shows that acquiring companies favor the stewardship perspective rather than the 
stagnation perspective and thus pay less (i.e. acquire at a discount) for a family firm target than 
for a non-family firm target. 
 
Keywords: Family business sale, valuation, matched-pairs, multiples. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The increasingly rapid change in the current business environment and the need for novel 
solutions often motivate firms to expand their resources through acquisitions (Makri, Hitt & 
Lane, 2010). Acquisition is a unique form of entrepreneurship activity through which a company 
(acquirer) acquires another company (target) (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson & Ireland, 1991). In the 
latter half of the 20
th
 century, acquisitions became a prominent strategy for many companies, 
large and small, to acquire complementary resources (Harrison et al., 1991). Their strategic use to 
acquire new resources has become a well institutionalized corporate phenomenon (Uhlenbruck, 
Hitt & Semadeni, 2006), primarily because acquisition targets provide opportunities for 
organizational learning by exposing the acquirer to new and diverse ideas, thereby overcoming 
resource-based constraints to growth (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1990). 
However, while acquisition has received considerable research attention in the strategic 
management literature (e.g. Harrison et al., 1991), and although family firms are the most 
common form of organizations throughout the world,  accounting for over 75% of all registered 
companies in most economies (Miller, Steier & Le Breton-Miller, 2003), only few recent studies 
have focused on family firms’ acquisitions (e.g. Basu, Dimitrova & Paeglis, 2009; Caprio, Croci 
& Del Giudice, 2008; Holmen & Nivorozhkin, 2007; Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2010; 
Mickelson & Worley, 2003; Steen & Welch, 2006). A family firm is here defined as an 
organization in which a family has a substantial ownership stake, and has at least two of its 
members in key management positions (see Chirico & Nordqvist, 2010; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, 
Lester & Cannella, 2007; Westhead & Cowling, 1998; Zahra, Neubaum & Larraneta, 2007). 
A central issue in any acquisition is the valuation of the target company by the acquirer – 
a procedure to determine the price to be paid for the acquisition (i.e. acquire at a discount or 
premium). Surprisingly, none of the aforementioned family-firm studies compared valuation of 
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privately-held family firm targets with non-family firm targets. Our empirical research attempts 
to fill this gap in the family-firm literature, thus suggesting important implications for research 
and practice. Two major views have been constructed regarding the nature of family firms: 
stewardship vs. stagnation (Miller, Le Breton-Miller & Scholnick, 2008). The stewardship 
perspective suggests that family members view themselves as stewards of the family firm, and 
thus nurture it for the support of future generations through stewardship over the continuity of 
business, employees, and customer relationships. This enables family firms to perform better than 
non-family firms. Alternatively, the stagnation perspective proposes that family organizations 
face unique challenges to growth and expansion mainly because of resource restrictions. Miller et 
al. (2008)’s findings fully substantiate the stewardship perspective but not the stagnation 
perspective (see also Anderson & Reeb, 2003). 
Building on the above-arguments, we argue that although most theoretical and empirical 
research explicitly recognizes the prevalence and superior performance of family firms around 
the world (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Astrachan & Shanker, 2003; Koiranen & Chirico, 2006; 
Miller et al., 2008; Sharma, 2004), acquirers tend to regard the family firm as an unprofessional 
and inefficient organization in which decision-making processes are driven by emotions rather 
than by economic rationality (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson & Moyano-
Fuentes, 2007; Salvato, Chirico & Sharma, 2010a, b).  Hence, acquirers are disposed to pay a 
lower price (i.e. acquire at a discount) for a family firm target than for a non-family firm target. 
We believe that a focus on family firms may both advance knowledge on the evaluation of target 
firms and help us understand specifically why acquiring companies pay a discount price for 
family firm targets as compared to non-family firm targets.  
The potential insights that can be gained by addressing evaluation issues in acquisitions 
from a family perspective result from the unique and distinguished features of family firms when 
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compared to non-family firms. The family firm is indeed the only organization in which family 
members are simultaneously active in the family and the business, hence significantly influencing 
business performance (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon & Very, 2007; Chirico & Salvato, 2008; Chirico, 
Ireland & Sirmon, 2010). Thus, tangible and intangible resources are unique in this type of 
organization since they result from interactions between the family, its individual members, and 
the business (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Consequently, when the target company is a family firm 
whose economic value stems not only from the business, but also from the family, evaluating 
such firm can become quite complex. A detailed examination from both the family and business’ 
aspects is therefore required at the time of acquisition. However, acquirers generally tend to focus 
their attention on the negative aspects of a family firm. In their eyes, stagnation drawbacks 
prevail over stewardship advantages, thus underestimating its real value. 
We explore the overlooked topic of valuing family firms within the context of acquisition, 
using a unique dataset of privately-held family and non-family firm targets. Given that the 
valuation of both privately-held family and non-family firms is a difficult and often highly 
subjective process, especially because a privately-held company has no observable stock price to 
serve as an objective measure of market value, we relied on valuations from recent acquisitions. 
We employed a matched-pairs method for statistical analysis, and the standard technique of 
multiples as measures of value (see Alouche, Amann, Jaussaud & Kurashina, 2008; Koeplin, 
Sarin & Shapiro, 2000). We note the absence of multiples in previous family firm literature. 
Accordingly, we offer practical implications for potential family firm targets as well as their 
acquirers. 
This article is organized in the following manner. We first review the literature on 
resource-based logic in acquisitions. We then discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the 
family firm, and explore how it is perceived by external investors in the acquisition process. 
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Accordingly, we develop our hypothesis followed by a description of the methodology. The 
paper ends with the results, discussion, contributions and limitations of the study. Implications 
for research and practice are shared in the concluding section. 
RESOURCE-BASED LOGIC IN ACQUISITIONS 
The resource-based view of the firm is a useful framework for studying the sources of 
value creation (Sirmon, Hitt & Ireland, 2007). The essence of resource-based logic rests in an 
emphasis on bundles of unique tangible and intangible resources at the firm’s disposal as the 
foundation for creating value and competitive advantages (Barney, 1991). The common factor 
driving acquisition strategies is that in dynamic markets with increased globalization, it is hard 
for a single firm to possess all resources needed to develop and sustain current competitive 
advantages. Thus, most organizations rely on other organizations to help support growth 
objectives (Chirico, Ireland & Sirmon, forthcoming; Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1991; 
Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008). Furthermore, the complexity of modern products and services, 
and the changing consumer demands, increase interdependence among organizations and amplify 
the need to recombine resources (Capron, Mitchell & Swaminathan, 2001; Sirmon et al., 2007). 
In this instance, no other combination of firms can produce the same value, meaning that the 
synergy is the source of a competitive advantage (Makri et al., 2010). Novel resources that a firm 
cannot create independently are thus developed and new markets are entered through 
acquisitions. Accordingly, Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland (1990) argue that acquisitions may serve 
as a substitute for innovation. For example, firms may acquire target companies with technology 
different from their own so as to acquire new product lines without assuming high risks involved 
in internal innovation (Harrison et al., 1991; Hitt et al., 2001; Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002; 
Sirmon & Lane, 2004). 
 32 
In sum, firms acquire companies characterized by resources that they themselves lack, 
such as management teams with specialized knowledge in a specific area or market. Thus, it 
becomes extremely important to thoroughly evaluate the tangible and intangible resources 
available in the potential target company so as to determine its economic value and the price to be 
paid for its acquisition (see Fernández, 2002; Koeplin et al., 2000). In the next sections, we argue 
that the valuation issue can be specifically complex when the target company is a family firm 
whose economic value stems from both the family and business’ sides (e.g. family members’ 
idiosyncratic knowledge). Accordingly, we first present the family firm as a repository of 
valuable tangible and intangible resources which can be exploited by external investors through 
acquisition strategies (Arregle et al., 2007; Miller et al., 2008; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Then, we 
describe how acquirers’ perception of a family firm target may strongly affect their valuation 
compared to a non-family firm target’s valuation. 
THE FAMILY FIRM  
Stewardship vs. Stagnation Perspectives 
That family firms play a dominant and crucial role in today's economy is now well 
documented (Colli, 2003; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). Family firms are 
depicted as emotionally committed organizations characterized by intense interactions among 
family members within the family and the business. Emotional attachment and rational judgment 
are inseparably intertwined, thereby significantly affecting the strategic decision-making 
processes (Chirico & Nordqvist, 2010; Olson, Zuiker, Danes, Stafford, Heck, & Duncan, 2003; 
Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). The essential qualities of family firms result in equally distinctive 
organizational behaviors and outcomes in which the interaction of two social systems – the 
family and the business – enables family members to simultaneously participate in both family 
 33 
and business relationships in their personal and professional lives (Chirico & Salvato, 2008). 
Miller et al. (2008) found that the family firm is, in many respects, an especially salutary 
organizational form, repository of valuable resources and conducive to corporate longevity 
compared to a non-family firm (see also Chirico et al., forthcoming; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 
Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). 
Two major views have been constructed regarding the nature of family firms: stagnation 
vs. stewardship (Miller et al., 2008). The stewardship theory considers the family to be a source 
of competitive advantage whose uniqueness derives from the integration of family and business. 
In family firms, both family-member owners and managers view themselves as stewards of the 
family firm; their motives are aligned with the objectives of the organization which must be 
nurtured to support the future generations (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). Family members are 
altruistically dedicated to the business and tend to place the business’s objectives ahead of their 
own. Such an altruistic behavior helps strengthen family relations by reducing relationship 
conflicts and fostering trust, interdependence and commitment to the family’s long term success 
(Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007). Miller et al. (2008) delineate the 
three following forms of stewardship in family firms: Stewardship over the continuity of 
business: It reflects family members’ strong emotional attachment to the organization (Astrachan 
& Jaskiewicz, 2008; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Stockmans, Lybaert, & Voordeckers, 2010) 
which contributes to an extraordinary commitment to proactively search for innovative strategies 
and exercise stewardship over the well-being and continuity of the firm in the long run (Miller & 
Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Miller et al., 2008; Salvato et al., 2010a, b). Stewardship over the 
continuity leads family firms to invest more in product research, market share and reputation 
developments compared to non-family firms. Stewardship over employees: It indicates the special 
care for the family firm and its continuity resulting from building “a group of talented, motivated 
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and loyal employees” to guarantee family’s prosperity over time (Miller et al., 2008, p. 55). To 
this end, intensive training programs are developed in order to coach employees to do their job 
well, foster the development of new products and acquire new knowledge (Chirico, 2008; Chirico 
& Salvato, 2008; Chirico & Nordqvist, 2010). Stewardship over customer relationships: It 
suggests that family firms are interested in “building enduring networks and associations with 
clients and other suppliers of valuable resources” (Miller et al., 2008, p. 56). This motivates 
family firms to be closer to their customers, to improve the exchange of information with them, 
and to consolidate their family trademark by directing more effort into marketing activities such 
as telemarketing and trade shows (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Miller et al., 2008).  
On the contrary, stagnation perspective depicts family firms as organizations facing the 
challenge of being undercapitalized and subject to conservatism and characterized by slow-
growing performance and short life span (Miller et al., 2008; Morck & Yeung, 2003). Lack of 
financial capital often leads to deficiency of other resources such as skilled employees (Schulze, 
Lubatkin & Dino, 2003; Zahra et al., 2007). Parents may act altruistically towards their children, 
thereby hiring them despite incompetency. Talented non-family managers may have an aversion 
to work in family organizations when more prestigious working positions are often reserved for 
family members (Schulze et al., 2003). Consequently, knowledge heterogeneity to promote novel 
and creative ideas is substantially reduced (Chirico, 2008; Chirico & Salvato, 2008). Resource 
constraints may also lead to conservatism and induce family members to avoid crucial strategic 
decisions to maintain family security (Salvato et al., 2010a, b). As a result, such organizations 
may develop cultures that make them inflexible, resistant to change, and inclined to stick to path-
dependent traditions that limit growth of the firm (Chirico & Nordqvist, 2010; Dyer, 1986). Some 
authors explicitly refer to a “generational shadow” - an enduring effect of previous strategic paths 
and practices on a family firm’ subsequent evolution (Davis & Harveston, 1999). 
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It is worthy to note and underline that Miller et al. (2008, p. 73) find support for the 
stewardship view and no confirmation whatsoever for the stagnation view, suggesting that “the 
family firm form is in many respects an especially vibrant one”. Also, Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
conclude that a long-term focus gives family companies a leg up over non-family rivals.  
In the next sections, we will argue and empirically demonstrate that acquirers attribute a 
lower valuation to a family firm target compared to a non-family firm target, primarily because 
they perceive the family firm as an unprofessional organization in which stagnation motives 
prevail over stewardship motives. 
Valuing Family versus Non-Family firms in the Acquisitions Context 
The valuation of a target company is relevant to determine the price to be paid for its 
acquisition. Based on this value, the acquirer will acquire at a premium (i.e. price for a target firm 
> average price paid for comparable companies) or discount (price for a target firm < average 
price paid for comparable companies) (Koeplin et al., 2000). There are multiple approaches to 
company valuation, such as cash-flow discounting methods, income statement-based methods, as 
well as rarely used balance sheet-based and goodwill-based methods (Benninga & Sarig, 1997; 
Fernández, 2002).   
Building on our previous arguments, a growing body of research suggests that family 
firms outperform non-family firms (see Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Astrachan & Shanker, 2003; 
Koiranen & Chirico, 2006; Miller et al., 2008; Sharma, 2004) on a number of important indices 
such as market capitalization, return on assets, return on equity, as well as normalized compound 
returns (Allouche, Amann, Jaussaud & Kurashina, 2008; Robertson, 2007). For instance, Castillo 
and Wakefield (2006) reported higher levels of company’s cash balance and return on investment 
(ROI) for family firms than for non-family firms.  
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Most previous studies have regarded family firms as solid and valuable organizational 
forms whose resources have been carefully built by family members across generations. Indeed, 
given that family firms are long-term oriented, family members in key management positions are 
induced by their strong commitment, collectivistic value, collective identity and sense of trust, 
and altruism to “actively intermingle business and family resources” to guarantee the continuity 
of their business (Haynes, Walker, Rowe & Hong, 1999, p. 238) with a reduced recourse to debt 
(Gallo & Villaseca, 1996). To support their collective identity based on a collectivistic culture, in 
which each member views himself as part of “a larger (family or social) group [focusing on 
‘we’], rather than as an isolated independent being [focusing on ‘I’]” (VandenBos, 2007, p. 195), 
family members commit to the success of their business. They are well-disposed towards 
investing ‘patient financial capital’ (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003), they go beyond the call of duty, and 
exert extra efforts on behalf of their organization. For instance, family members are prone to 
make the necessary personal sacrifices and supply extra capital in the form of additional working 
hours, lower salary, free labor and use of personal savings to keep the business healthy across 
generations (c.f. survivability capital; Olson et al., 2003; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Moreover, they 
invest greater resources in employee trainings, customer relationships, and research and 
development of new offerings; they give more attention to boosting the reputation of the business 
and put more emphasis on broadening the market and the share of the market (Miller et al., 2005; 
2008).  
Interestingly, in a note to its clients in September 2007, Credit Suisse, one of the world's 
biggest investment banks from Switzerland, recommended that investors consider taking long-
term positions in companies with a significant family management influence because of their 
superior performance. Credit Suisse publicly announced that the firms in its family index had 
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outperformed their sectors by an average of 8 per cent in 2007, with a similar trend since the start 
of their research in 1996 (Robertson, 2007).  
Hence, an acquiring company whose goal is to have access to valuable complementary 
resources should positively value a potential family firm target’s resources which are carefully 
built by family members across generations. Certainly, when skilled family members -repository 
of knowledge- are retained in the acquiring company, then stewardship advantages in terms of 
family members’ values, devotion towards the business, human capital and enduring customer 
relationships persist after acquisition, thus making the family firm a genuinely valuable 
organizational form to be acquired. To this end, it becomes essential to retain at least some of the 
family members who represent repositories of specific tacit knowledge resources that may be 
difficult to imitate or acquire elsewhere (Chirico & Salvato, 2008; Chirico et al., 2010; Hitt et al., 
2001; Zahra et al., 2007). For instance, based on a sample of 147 acquisitions, Krishnan, Miller & 
Judge (1997, p. 371) empirically found that the lower the turnover among the acquired firm top 
management team, the better the post acquisition performance. They conclude that “The 
acquisition process is most successful when organizational learning occurs… Furthermore, it 
appears that a crucial aspect of organizational learning is the blending of top management teams, 
rather than emasculation of one or both teams”. 
There are basically two views that acquirers could adopt with respect to family firm 
targets: the stagnation perspective versus the stewardship perspective. Nevertheless, the term 
family firm is commonly and too often associated with concepts such as small unprofessional 
business (Gumpert & Boyd, 1984), autocratic business (Dyer, 1986), stagnant business (Daily & 
Dollinger, 1992), founder’s shadow (Davis & Harveston, 1999), nepotism (Vinton, 1998), path 
dependency (Chirico et al., 2010), and paternalism and family inertia (Chirico & Nordqvist, 
2010). Indeed, a common belief is that family firms are inefficient firms, sometimes perceived as 
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‘old-fashioned’ and boring (Buckley, 2006). They are depicted as more conservative than their 
non-family peers by operating at lower levels of innovation (Benson, 1991; Gómez-Mejía et al., 
2007; Morck & Yeung, 2003). Accordingly, in the eyes of acquirers, the stagnation view seems 
to prevail over the stewardship perspective (see Miller et al., 2008). In support of this line of 
thought, Dawson (2009) found that external investors positively value family firms only when 
non-family managers are also involved in the management of the company. Non-family managers 
improve the perceived quality of the family firm's human capital by being associated with a 
certain level of professionalism and by showing a certain degree of family members’ willingness 
to delegate authority and be open to outsiders. Moreover, external investors perceive non-family 
managers to be as professional as themselves (Byrne, 1971; Dawson, 2009; Jackson, Brett, Sessa, 
Cooper, Julin & Peyronnin, 1991). The above arguments suggest the propensity of external 
parties to look at a family firm as an unprofessional and low-performing organization. Such 
negative perception is mitigated only when non-family members – perceived to be more 
professional – are active in management.  
To sum up, while the family firm is a valuable organizational form, and although most 
family firm’ advantages persist after acquisition if some of the family members are retained in the 
acquiring company (e.g. valuable resources carefully  built over generations by committed family 
members; family members’ devotion towards the business, human capital; customer 
relationships), picturing the family firm as an unprofessional and inefficient form of organization 
drives the acquiring company to underestimate the family firm’ real value and pay less (i.e. 
acquire at a discount) for it as compared to a non-family firm. In other terms, negative family 
factors, based on stagnation, prevail over positive ones, based on stewardship and thus the 
acquiring company attributes a lower valuation to a family firm target compared to a non-family 
firm target. The underlying assumption is that financial markets are inefficient (Shleifer & 
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Vishny, 2003). Acquirers do not properly analyze the advantages of potential family firm targets 
and are disposed to pay a lower price for their acquisition. Also, family firm targets have a 
weaker bargaining position compared to non-family firm targets because of the general and 
common external investors’ perception that family firms are unprofessional organizations. Thus, 
they are inclined to trade at a discount. These arguments lead us to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1:  Acquirers favor the stagnation perspective rather than the stewardship 
perspective and thus pay less (i.e. acquire at a discount) for a family firm target than for a non-
family firm target. 
 
METHODS 
Data Collection 
To collect the data for our study, we first identified all acquisitions of medium-large 
privately-held companies belonging to the Food&Drink industry in Western Europe, on the 
Mergermarket database between 2000 and mid-2008 for which the necessary historical financial 
data were available. Privately-held companies are owned by a relatively limited number of 
shareholders and are not traded on a public stock exchange (Blackman, 1995). Our privately-held 
company dataset includes both family and non-family firms. While the former have families as 
major owners, the latter are organized as cooperatives (a common organization structure for the 
Food&Drink industry), held by individual entrepreneurs, private equity and other non-publicly-
listed owners.  
Some relevant information regarding our dataset is provided here. First, the choice of the 
Food&Drink industry was motivated by the following reasons. The Food&Drink industry has an 
intense consolidation activity to supply enough observations (i.e. acquisitions). The Food&Drink 
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industry has also been found to include a large number of family firms, thus facilitating data 
collection (see e.g. Miller et al., 2007; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Moreover, focusing our 
attention on a single industry enabled us to neutralize the effect of industry on our final results. 
Second, most previous research on family firm’ performance has focused on publicly-listed 
firms, although the majority of companies worldwide are actually in private hands (Sciascia & 
Mazzola, 2008). Our study instead analyzed privately-held companies, thus focusing on the 
understudied segment of privately-held family firms involved in acquisitions. This also allowed 
us to avoid differences in valuation between privately-held and publicly-listed companies (i.e. 
liquidity discount) (Benninga & Sarig, 1997; Koeplin et al., 2000). Third, we omitted all 
acquisitions in which the target was a missing data for the enterprise value because this would 
have prevented us from calculating any of the necessary measures. Furthermore, we excluded all 
targets with negative operating profits
1
 (Damodaran, 2006; Liu, Nissim & Thomas, 2002). 
As mentioned before, a more conservative and accurate definition of family firm assumes 
the family (composed of multiple family members) to have a substantial ownership stake (51% or 
more of equity owned by the family) and at least two of its members in key management 
positions (Chirico & Nordqvist, 2010; Miller et al., 2007; Westhead & Cowling, 1998; Zahra et 
al., 2007). A family firm target was defined as such in our dataset if the two conditions 
mentioned above were satisfied. In particular, at least 51% ownership stake was in the hands of 
the family and at least two family managers were involved in the business before the acquisition. 
Finally, to maintain to some extent a certain degree of family influence after the transaction, we 
tried our best to focus our attention on those acquisitions in which one or more family members 
were retained in the firm after the acquisition, thus continuing an active role in the management 
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of the company. This is especially relevant in the Food&Drink industry where most of the 
product-making knowledge is tacit and resides in individuals (Makri et al., 2010).  
These selection criteria resulted in a dataset of 73 pairs of family and non-family firms. 
The sample size is comparable to previous acquisition studies based on the matched-pairs 
methodology (see e.g. Hotchkiss & Moradian, 1998; Koeplin et al., 2000). Specifically in our 
study, 59 acquirers positively answered our question of whether or not they retained one or more 
family members in the company after the acquisition.  The remaining 14 acquirers preferred 
either not to answer at all or explicitly indicated that the company was not authorized to disclose 
confidential information. Recognizing these differences, we ran the analysis first with all 73 pairs 
of companies, then with the reduced dataset of 59 pairs of companies, and finally with a sub-
dataset including only the companies in which at least two family members were retained in the 
new company. The latter is obviously the case in which family firm’ characteristics are more 
persistent after acquisition based on the stewardship perspective. Observing that results from the 
full dataset did not change significantly from that of the restricted datasets, we finally used the 
full dataset of 73 pairs of companies for our analysis. 
Given that most family firms are privately held and usually not obliged to disclose private 
information, it is extremely difficult to obtain reliable financial information on family firms 
(Wortman, 1994). The dataset used in this study represents a ‘unique’ collection of data, having 
family firms as target companies and financial information regarding their valuation at the time 
of acquisition. Table 1 depicts the country of origin of targets and acquirers. 36% of family firm 
targets and 40% of non-family firm targets are from the United Kingdom. The prevalence of the 
deals coming from this country can be explained by the higher propensity of UK companies to 
disclose financial data (Arruñada, 2008). 
<<Insert Table 1 about here>> 
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Matched-pairs Approach 
We adopted a matched-pairs research design in our study which allowed us to 
systematically compare family and non-family firms with a similar profile (Allouche et al., 2008; 
Westhead & Cowling, 1998). This method has already been used in previous mergers and 
acquisitions studies (Hotchkiss & Moradian, 1998; Koeplin et al., 2000) and in family-firm 
studies (Allouche et al., 2008; Jorissen, Laveren, Martens & Reheul, 2005; McConaughy, 
Matthews, & Fialko, 2001; Miller et al., 2007; Mishra, Randoy, & Jenssen, 2001).  
We established pairs of businesses (one family, one non-family) operating in the 
Food&Drink industry that matched in their size (in terms of sales and assets), geographical area, 
year of acquisition and products. Specifically, to confirm that the effect of size was neutralized 
(see Allouche et al., 2008; Koeplin et al., 2000), we performed a t-test analysis which, as 
expected, reported no significant differences between family and non-family firms in terms of 
sales (family firms: mean 123.88, median 47.18; non-family firms: mean 190.34, median 65.35; 
ns). Also, a non-significant result was obtained for assets (family firms: mean 114.00, median 
29.75, non-family firms: mean 162.15, median 31.56; ns). 
Multiples 
Multiples have been used as measures of value in this study. Penman (2004) defines 
multiple as the ratio of a market price variable (such as the stock price, the market capitalization, 
or the whole enterprise value) to a particular value driver (such as earnings, revenues, or the work 
force) of a firm. Enterprise value is defined as the value of the target company as a whole. It is 
calculated by adding together the implied equity value and the net debt of the target company2 
(Mergermarket, 2009). Multiples are considered to be a standard technique employed by 
                                                 
2
 The implied equity value is the value of the entire outstanding share capital of the target company as valued by the 
acquirer. This value always represents 100% regardless of what stake is actually being acquired. The net debt is 
equal to all interest bearing debt minus cash and cash equivalents. 
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investment professionals. Indeed, 90% of equity research valuations and 50% of acquisition 
valuations use some combination of multiples and comparable companies (Damodaran, 2002; 
Koeplin et al., 2000). In particular, multiples have been shown to result in the most accurate 
valuations when the companies are chosen on the basis of industry (Alford, 1992) as we have 
done in the present research. Multiples prove especially important for the valuation of relatively 
stable sectors such as the Food&Drink industry (Demirakos, Strong & Walker, 2004).  
To compare the mean of multiples between matched pairs of companies, the t-test 
procedure was adopted (see Allouche et al., 2008; Koeplin et al., 2000; Westhead & Cowling, 
1998). The multiples’ approach has been described by Damodaran (2006) in the following way. 
First, comparable assets that are priced by the market are found (i.e. acquisitions of comparable 
companies). Second, enterprise values that emerge from the market prices are scaled to a 
common variable to generate standardized prices for comparability (i.e. the enterprise value is 
divided by a relevant accounting measure). Third, standardized values are adjusted for 
differences across companies (e.g. industry, size, country, year and so forth).  
EBIT and EBITDA Multiples 
Despite the extensive use of multiples in valuation, there is no consensus on the use of 
any particular multiple (Lie & Lie, 2002). In our study, we specifically used two multiples that 
are often applied in mergers and acquisitions analysis: EBIT multiple (i.e. Enterprise 
Value/EBIT) and EBIDTA multiple (i.e. Enterprise Value/EBIDTA) (see e.g. Hotchkiss & 
Moradian, 1998; Koeplin et al., 2000). In fact, when the acquisition involves the whole business 
(versus just the equity in the business), it is recommended to examine the value of the firm as a 
multiple of the EBIT and/or the EBITDA (Damodaran, 2006).  They are two valuable measures 
of a firm’s cash flow, based on two different measures of earnings: Earnings Before Interest and 
Taxes (EBIT) and Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization of intangibles 
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(EBITDA). These two measures were selected rather than after-tax earnings because the values 
of EBIT and EBITDA are both independent of the capital structures (i.e. the mix of debt and 
equity) of the acquired companies. In contrast, the earnings (i.e. profits after tax) figure reflects 
the capital structure of the company because earnings are computed after interest expenses and 
taxes. Hence, two companies with identical profit streams may have different net earnings ratios 
due to differences in their capital structures. Thus, it is more appropriate to use a multiple based 
on earnings before interest and taxes to compensate for the differing capital structures of the two 
firms. Both EBIT and EBITDA provide a measure of company cash flows available to service 
debt and pay dividends. The difference between the two is that EBIT is computed net of 
depreciation, which is a non-cash expense, whereas EBITDA adds back depreciation 
(Damodaran, 2006; Koeplin et al., 2000).  
Additionally, EBIDTA is the most frequently used multiple and is considered the most 
appropriate measure to value a company. Indeed, it is often used in company reports and brokers’ 
calculations in both Europe and the US. For instance, Kim and Ritter (1999) used several 
multiples for the valuation of initial public offering matching companies (i.e. P/E, market value to 
book value, price to sales, enterprise value to sales, and enterprise value to EBITDA). However, 
they found that the EBITDA multiple resulted in the most precise valuation. Interestingly, Lie 
and Lie (2002) have also demonstrated that the EBIDTA multiple should be preferred even to 
EBIT, because depreciation expenses distort the information value of earnings. Moreover, 
EBITDA multiple is a more suitable measure in mature industries such as the Food & Drink 
industry (Fernàndez, 2001). 
Following the method used by Koeplin et al. (2000), the family firm discount or premium 
in this study was estimated, as follows: 
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Family firm Discount = 1 – (Family firm Multiple / Non-Family firm Multiple)
3
 
RESULTS  
The descriptive statistics and correlations of the study’s variables are presented in Table 2.  
The family firm discount or premium is shown in Table 3. The EBIT multiple produced a 
statistically non-significant result. But, when examining the EBIDTA multiple that is the most 
appropriate measure to value a firm, our findings indicate that family firm’ multiples are lower 
than those for non-family firms. Specifically, external investors acquire family firm targets at a 
moderately statistically significant discount relative to comparable non-family firm targets 
(discount mean: 16%; discount median: 5%; p<.10). That is, non-family firms are valued higher 
relative to comparable family firms. Hence, for two comparable businesses (one family, one non-
family) with the same EBITDA figure, buyers would pay less (i.e. acquire at a discount) for a 
family firm than for a comparable non-family firm, thus confirming our hypothesis (see Table 3).  
<<Insert Table 2 about here>> 
<<Insert Table 3 about here>> 
However, given the difference in results obtained with EBIT and EBIDTA multiples, as 
mentioned before, it is important to underline that EBITDA multiple is preferred over the EBIT 
multiple in the academic and practitioner communities (see e.g. Fernàndez, 2001; Lie & Lie, 
2002) The practical importance of the EBIDTA multiple is further confirmed by the existence of 
an index provided by Argos Soditic & Epsilon Research that measures the evolution of European 
private mid-market company prices via EV/EBITDA multiple (Argos Soditic, 2010). The index 
provider explains: “We think this multiple [EBITDA multiple] is the most suitable for a 
European index as it is not impacted by the target’s financial structure nor by its policies 
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regarding depreciation and provisioning (which vary in time and between countries). It is also the 
closest readily available proxy for operating cash flow”. (Argos Soditic, 2010, p. 3) 
As concerns our dataset, to further confirm the accuracy of the EBIDTA multiple over the 
EBIT multiple, and the statistical significance of our result, we compared the coefficients of 
variation (standard deviation divided by the mean) of the two multiples. EBIDTA multiple 
appears to have a much lower value of this coefficient (see Table 4). This indicates that there was 
more consensus about the value of EBIDTA multiple than about the EBIT multiple in 
acquisitions included in our dataset. 
<<Insert Table 4 about here>> 
Additionally, it is worthy to note that by running the analysis first with all 73 pairs of 
companies, and then with the reduced datasets (see data collection), results did not change 
substantially. If there is no observable difference in the result when  zero, one, or more than one 
family member are retained in the firm after the acquisition, then retaining family members does 
not bring any advantage from the acquirers’ point of view. If the acquirers value family firms at a 
discount even if they retain family members (as it is in 59 acquirers out of 73), it indicates that 
they do not appreciate the family firm’ advantages that can be transferred by the retained family 
members. This further supports our hypotheses
4
. Finally, to make sure that our result did not 
reflect poorer performance of family firm targets, we also ran a t-test to compare the EBITDA 
and EBIT margins (i.e. EBITDA/Sales and EBIT/Sales) between family and non-family firm 
targets. The differences in the margins’ means were not statistically significant (EBITDA/Sales: 
Family 13.73%, Non-family 13.94%, ns; EBIT/Sales: Family 9.22%, Non-family 9.16%, ns), 
thus allowing us to conclude that family and non-family firms have the same levels of 
performance as measured by margins (see Baliga, Moyer, & Rao, 1996). 
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 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this insightful comment. 
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DISCUSSION  
In the present study we explored the overlooked topic of valuing family firms in the 
context of acquisitions. Specifically, our objective was to shed light on the valuation of family 
firm targets compared to non-family firm targets. We argued that acquiring companies often 
perceive family firms as unprofessional and inefficient organizations, thus negatively affecting 
their valuation compared to similar non-family firm targets.  
When examining the EBIDTA multiple our empirical analysis confirmed our hypothesis 
that acquirers favor the stagnation perspective rather than the stewardship perspective and thus 
pay less (i.e. acquire at a discount) for a family firm target than for a non-family firm target. 
Also, although the EBIT multiple produced a statistically non-significant result, it offers some 
interesting insights. Indeed, it appears that EBIT of both family and non-family firms are valued 
similarly (Koeplin et al., 2000) which implies that acquires fail to discriminate between family 
and non-family firm targets. In light of this result, we may speculate that acquiring companies are 
unable to recognize the advantages associated with a family firm target compared to a non-family 
firm target.  
Contributions 
Some contributions emerge from our study. First, the present research contributes to 
filling the gap in the family firm literature regarding the study of valuation of privately-held 
family firm targets in the acquisitions context (see Basu et al., 2009; Mickelson & Worley, 2003; 
Steen & Welch, 2006). Our study indeed represents the first empirical research to shed light on 
the valuation of family firm targets compared to non-family firm targets, showing through the 
EBIDTA multiple that acquiring companies pay a lower price for a family firm target. 
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Second, the academic and business communities have often encouraged family-firm 
scholars to rely more on a matched-pairs methodology to develop comparable analysis between 
family and non-family firms (Jorissen et al., 2005; Westhead & Cowling, 1998). We adopt this 
method in our study and use two well-known and commonly used multiples (i.e. EBIT and 
EBIDTA multiples) that have not been employed in family firm studies to date. Further, 
following the study of Westhead & Cowling (1998, p. 33), adoption of the matched-pairs 
methodology enabled us to discover “real” differences rather than “sample” differences between 
family and non-family firm targets. 
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, the dataset used in this study represents a ‘unique’ 
collection of data; it comprises of family firms as target companies, and, despite the difficulty in 
obtaining financial information for family firms, contains a set of family firms whose financial 
information at the time of acquisition was disclosed. 
Limitations 
Several limitations should also be noted. We argue that a family firm is a more solid 
organization compared to a non-family firm given that family members invest greater resources 
in employees’ training, customer relationships, research and development, and company 
reputation (see Chirico et al., forthcoming; Miller et al., 2005; 2008). However, although we did 
our best to ensure that the data reflected a certain degree of family influence after the transaction 
(see methods), our data did not allow us to fully investigate whether family firm’ characteristics 
are effectively persistent after acquisition. The present gap needs to be addressed in future studies 
on acquisitions and valuations of family firms. Although we are aware of the difficulty in 
achieving this goal, building a larger dataset including family firm targets in which multiple 
family member managers are retained in the active management of the acquiring company, will 
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help in this direction. In such case, post acquisition performance when the target company is a 
family firm versus a non-family firm should also be examined. 
Further, given the data limitation, we were unable to match our companies for earnings 
growth
5
. However, Alford (1992, p. 107) obtained evidence that, if controlled for industry type, 
additionally controlling for earnings growth in the analysis does not reduce valuation errors. In 
other words, “industry appears to be a good surrogate for the component of…earnings growth 
related to multiples”. 
Finally, the generalization of our findings remains limited to the specific industry and 
geographical areas on which our dataset was built. 
Research Implications 
The present article may be regarded as a point of departure for guiding and pushing 
forward further research. First, given that acquisitions are an important part of the business 
process of redeploying resources into more productive uses (Ahuja & Katila, 2001), more 
research should be directed to how family firm’ resources can be effectively integrated into the 
acquiring company, and whether the process may be facilitated when the acquirer is also a family 
firm (Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2010; Miller, Le Breton-Miller & Lester, 2010). Recent 
studies argue that within an inter-firm cooperation, when both parties involved are family firms, 
similarity in the family status provides a contextual understanding (Chirico et al., forthcoming). 
Both parties benefit from complementary resources, shared levels of commitment and similar 
appreciation of socioemotional wealth, thus leading to a competitive advantage (Stockmans et al., 
2010). Hence, family-firm acquirers could be more willing to pay a premium for family-firm 
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 We were able to collect information on earnings growth only for 47 observations for family firms and 37 for non-
family firms. As expected, after performing the t-test, the mean growth rates of family and non-family firms resulted 
to be statistically insignificant. 
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targets, as they may be better suited to leveraging synergies based on family-specific common 
resources
6
. 
Second, although most previous studies confirm that family firms perform better than 
non-family firms, we admit that this may appear somewhat unrealistic and not general to all 
family organizations that are heterogeneous entities (Chirico & Nordqvist, 2010; Chirico et al., 
2010; Westhead & Howorth, 2007). Future studies should detail to what extent such a superior 
performance of family firms exists, especially when acquirers need to evaluate potential family 
versus non-family firm targets. Following the same line of thought, several questions require 
further exploration. For instance, is it enough that a family firm is a solid organization at the time 
of acquisition for acquirers to pay a premium compared to comparable non-family firms? To 
what extent and under what conditions do idiosyncratic family characteristics persist after 
acquisition? And, even though Miller et al. (2008) did not find support for the stagnation 
perspective, do the possible negative aspects of a family firm underlined by the stagnation 
perspective, such as conservatism and nepotism, disappear once the family firm is acquired in the 
new company? Future research clearly needs to be channeled in these directions. 
Third, with few exceptions (see Miller et al., 2008), most of the empirical results on which 
we base our theoretical section stem from the analysis of large and public firms. On the contrary, 
although our dataset is composed of medium-large companies, these companies are privately-
held. Future studies may replicate our work on a dataset of public companies and find out 
whether results would change for public organizations. 
Fourth, accounting measures of value may be also a possible line for future research. For 
example, scholars may further explore whether difference in multiples we found can be also 
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attributed to differences in accounting practices in family versus non-family firms (Cascino, 
Pugliese, Mussolino, & Sansone, 2010; Yang, 2010).  
Finally, scholars may take into consideration the quantity of transferred shares so as to 
account for control discount effect. For instance, the control discount effect would be lower if 
transferred shareholding interest is about 51%, and higher if it is about 100%
7
.   
Practical Implications 
This research has several practical implications. For the acquirers, we show that family 
firm targets are undervalued relative to comparable non-family firm peers (see EBIDTA 
multiple’s result). We argue that their ‘real’ value is not recognized by the acquirers. The typical 
due diligence processes in mergers and acquisitions commonly focus on financial health (Hitt et 
al., 2001) and rarely extend beyond to identify special knowledge stocks held by targets (Makri et 
al., 2010). Consequently, if family firm’ idiosyncratic family knowledge or other positive 
characteristics prove significant in a specific target, this may provide a unique investment 
opportunity for acquiring companies. Instead, the acquirer tends to underestimate the family firm 
target’s value and is inclined to pay less for a business whose value may be in fact higher, and 
thus risks losing valuable investment opportunities when the family-firm target is averse to 
selling at a lower price.  
Acquirers also need to understand that a part of target company’s managers should be 
retained in the acquiring company, especially when the target company is a family firm with 
members who possess idiosyncratic knowledge and values that are hard to imitate or acquire 
elsewhere (Chirico, 2008; Chirico & Salvato, 2008; Chirico & Nordqvist, 2010). The key is to 
find target firms with complementary human capital (i.e. knowledge stocks) that remains and 
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becomes part of the main company. In doing so, the process of recombining existing resources 
with external resources gained via acquisition can be quicker and easier after the acquisition.  
For family firm owners, we showed that their firms are likely to be assigned a lower value 
than they are worth. The negative consequence for the family firm target is evident: it gets less 
money than it is worth. Hence, family firm targets need to send positive signals to their acquirers 
to mitigate the general negative perception that the potential acquirers may have regarding the 
family organization form. They need to explicitly prove the solidness of their firm, given that 
such firm was built and managed to last long. Instead, family firms are commonly characterized 
by a low level of transparency and managed with a “veil of secrecy” (Castillo & Wakefield, 
2006, p.49). Moreover, family firm targets need to persuade acquirers that their advantages will 
persist. This goal may be achieved for instance by retaining multiple knowledgeable family 
managers in the company, by having in place long-term customer contracts, by agreeing to accept 
a part of acquisition payment upon reaching some milestone (e.g. revenue target), or by 
quantifying and reporting intangible family-based resources to third parties, and so forth. 
In conclusion, we hope that this research informs, extends and encourages future work on 
family firms’ acquisitions and suggests changes in the managerial way of thinking when a family 
firm target is involved in the acquisition process.  
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TABLES 
Table 1. Country of Origin of Targets and Acquirers 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations  
  Mean Std. dev 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Assets 138.45 347.02 1     
2. Sales 157.11 314.41 .832** 1    
3. EBITDA 21.34 63.43 .910** .872** 1   
4. EBIT 14.76 46.2 .882** .841** .988** 1  
5. Family dummy .5 .5 -.07 -.11 -.1 -.09 1 
** p <.01; N. 146 
Values expressed in USD million (Assets, Sales, EBITDA, EBIT) 
 
Table 3. Family Firm Discount/Premium 
  Family firms Non-family firms Discount 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Sig. 
EBIT multiple 34.82 16.15 30.58 15.16 -14% -7% ns 
Family Non-family 
Country Target Acquirer Target Acquirer 
     Americas N/A 3 N/A 4 
     BeNeLux 7 8 3 3 
     France 8 6 13 8 
     Germany 2 2 1 0 
     Italy 10 4 6 3 
    Spain 8 9 9 11 
    UK 26 24 29 27 
    Nordic Countries 8 8 6 7 
    Others 4 9 6 9 
    Unknown 0 0 0 1 
 61 
EBITDA multiple 11.28 9.78 13.39 10.33 16% 5% * 
*: p<.10 
ns: Not statistically significant. 
  
 
Table 4. Coefficient of Variation of the Multiples 
  
 
 
 
 EBIT 
Multiple 
EBITDA 
Multiple 
Family firms 3.12 .52 
Non-family firms 1.47 .68 
All firms 2.52 .62 
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Abstract: The succession issue, both intergenerational and outside the family, is a very important 
topic for family firm practitioners. However, only the former has received significant attention in 
academia.  This paper focuses on the private equity firms, one of the major players in family firm 
succession field. Our research seeks to answer whether private equity firms distinguish between 
family and non-family businesses, whether their attitude is positive or negative, and how family 
firms are perceived by their acquirers. Data was collected through an open-ended questionnaire, 
analyzed using the content analysis technique, and followed-up with expert interviews. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Succession is probably the most challenging task in family firms. Thus, it is not surprising 
that it is the oldest and the most researched domain in the family firm academia. This topic 
continued to be prevalent throughout the history of the academic research on family firms, i.e. the 
last thirty years (Chittoor & Das, 2007). However, very little has been said about succession 
routes alternative to intergenerational transfer (Goosens, Manigart & Meuleman, 2008). The 
ownership transfer can take different forms such as sale to a strategic or a financial buyer, 
management buyout or buy-in, or an initial public offering (IPO). In this paper we address the 
issue of family firm succession outside the family. We specifically focus on private equity firms, 
a highly important class of acquirers. The purpose of this study was to determine how investors 
perceive family firm targets and whether the perception is reflected in their valuation. Our major 
contribution is that we explicitly assess what family firms’ picture private equity firms have and 
whether this has any consequences on the valuation. 
This article is organized in the following manner. First, we briefly review the literature on 
within-the-family succession and argue why it is important to study alternative succession routes. 
Second, we explain our motivation behind choosing private equity as potential outside 
successors. The succession outside the family is an understudied topic with no previous research 
on private equity investors’ perception of family firm targets. Hence, we decided to follow the 
route of an exploratory research where we did not limit our interviewees to a fixed set of possible 
responses. Accordingly, we describe the methodology and data collection process followed by 
the description of respondents. The paper ends with the results, discussion, contributions and 
limitations of the study. Implications for research and practice are shared in the concluding 
section. 
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GAP IN THE LITERATURE 
Solving the Succession Issue outside the Family 
Succession has traditionally been the most important topic in family business research. 
The pioneers of family business research understood that a key issue challenging the majority of 
family firms was succession and thus dedicated studies to this topic (Handler, 1989; Wortman, 
1994). Between 1988 and 1997, succession was still a dominant theme according to Dyer and 
Sanchez (1998) who reviewed 186 articles published in Family Business Review. Chrisman et al. 
(2003) analyzed 190 articles published or presented between 1996 and 2003 and came to the 
same conclusion: succession was the main topic presented in 22% of all the articles analyzed.  
From a practical point-of-view, succession is gaining even more importance in the current 
demography where baby-boomers, many of whom are family business founders, are starting to 
approach retirement age and have to confront succession and change of ownership issues 
(Hickey, 2005). Passing the business on to the family successor depends on the desires and 
attitudes of each generation (Birley, 1986). The younger generation must be interested in 
continuing the family business and be able to do so. However, successors may have business 
interests different from those of their parents. If such circumstances arise, sale of a family firm 
may be necessary to open up the way to pursue new business opportunities for the next 
generations as well as to free up some capital. It has been noted that at least one half of the family 
firms in Switzerland will solve the succession issue by transferring ownership outside the family 
(Halter et al., 2009). Also in Germany there is a growing trend to sell family firms to third 
parties. According to a PWC study, 70,000 family firms each year have problems finding a 
successor, with 30,000 forced to sell (Gow, 2007). In the US, only around 30% of the family 
businesses survive to the second generation (Astrachan & Allen, 2003; Leach & Bogood, 1999), 
and only 15% make it to the third (Leach & Bogood, 1999). In the UK, only 24% of the family 
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businesses manage to be handed over to the second generation and only around 15% to the third 
(Leach & Bogood, 1999; Bytestart website, 2005). A Deloitte survey of privately-held businesses 
revealed that merely less than 10% of the UK business owners will never seek an exit and will let 
the business remain in the family (Cohen, 2009). This means that the majority of family 
businesses, sooner or later, will change hands; this phenomenon is quite universal and 
independent of cultural context or economic environment (Lee et al., 2003). Investment 
professionals have already recognized the potential of these acquisition targets. They perceive 
family firms to be a very hot market in terms of the number of deals (Reinebach, 2007).  
In summary, a change in ownership, whether it be through family succession or sale, is 
inevitable for all family businesses. Evidence suggests that the latter option prevails over the 
former. Yet, according to Howorth, Westhead and Wright (2004), academic research focuses 
almost exclusively on internal succession.  
Private Equity Firms 
Private equity companies are one of the most important classes of acquirers of family 
businesses. They invest in unquoted companies at both an early stage (venture capital) and at a 
later stage (buyouts) (Wood & Wright, 2009). Typically, private equity firms purchase majority 
of the control of an existing or mature firm (Kaplan & Stroemberg, 2009). These investment 
vehicles first appeared in the 1980s (Kaplan & Stroemberg, 2009), yet they did not receive wide 
publicity until their “golden age” between 2002 and 2007. Despite the fact that there is a 
considerable amount of practitioner literature on private equity, it is a relatively new topic in 
academia (Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, & Zutter, 2008). Even less developed is the academic 
research on private equity in family firms. It has been described as being still in its infancy 
(Achleitner Schraml, & Tappeiner, 2008). 
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Private equity funds represent 25% of the global M&A activity (Jensen, 2007). Private 
equity investment firms typically target privately-held companies, many of whom are family 
businesses. Indeed, over the last twenty years buyouts of privately-held family firms have 
become widely accepted forms of transferring ownership in firms facing succession problems 
(Meuleman, Amess, Wright, & Scholes, 2009). Private equity succession route can be 
particularly suitable for family firms for the following reasons: continued independent ownership 
of the firm is assured; original management team can stay in place; implicit contracts with 
employees can continue; and the family has the possibility to stay involved in the firm (Goosens 
et al., 2008). The Centre for Management Buy-out and Private Equity Research revealed that 
38% of European buyouts in 2007 targeted family firms (CMBOR, 2007). 
The few studies on private equity investments in family firms (e.g. Achleitner et al., 2008; 
Howorth et al., 2004) have focused on family firm motivations and the deal process. The most 
similar research to the current study was undertaken by Dawson (2009) who examined decision-
making models used by the Italian private equity investors in their selection of family firms. Our 
study however deals with a broader range of family firm attributes; this was possible by not 
restraining private equity respondents to a predefined set of characteristics. 
We believe that the topic of family firm succession is highly important and that there is a 
strong need to close the gap in the literature. From the theoretical point of view, it is important 
because family business academia and family firms themselves recognize their distinctiveness. 
But what about third parties, in particular, investors? Do they perceive family firms as a separate 
class of companies? And what characteristics do they attribute to family firms? From the 
practitioners’ point of view, understanding private equity firms’ perception of family firms can 
benefit both sides. Acquirers can benchmark attitude towards family firms and be better prepared 
to handle family firm investments. Family firms can understand acquirers’ perception, address 
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weaknesses and potentially achieve a higher valuation. Surprisingly, this topic has been ignored 
not only by the family firm scholars, but also by private equity scholars who have focused their 
attention on large public-to-private transaction, leaving the family firm buyout subject 
understudied (Cumming, Siegel & Wright, 2007). Dawson (2009) argued that private equity 
professionals among others use family firm specific criteria. However, we found no previous 
studies which highlighted these criteria. Consequently, our paper has an exploratory character. In 
the next section, we will explain in more detail the motivation behind our choice to pursue an 
exploratory research, as well as describe procedure. 
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Exploratory Research 
We believe our study is unique since it is the first research that aims to reveal the 
characteristics of a privately-held family firm from the point of view of its investors. Due to the 
lack of previous research on the topic, our work is organized in the form of a qualitative study 
and has an exploratory character. We wanted to obtain a picture of family firms’ characteristics, 
as drawn by the companies that routinely analyze numerous privately-held family firm targets. In 
general terms, rather than testing a hypothesis about reality, we intended to make a statement 
about how actors interpret reality (Suddaby, 2006). Qualitative research has been described as 
appropriate for understanding the world from the perspective of those studied (Pratt, 2009). This 
type of research is increasingly being published, has won multiple best paper awards in Academy 
of Management Journal (AMJ) and Administrative Science Quarterly, and was overrepresented 
in the AMJ’s survey about the most interesting management-related studies (Bartunek, Rynes & 
Ireland, 2006; Pratt, 2009). Although it is gaining popularity, there are still no rigid guidelines on 
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undertaking qualitative research. Pratt (2009) argues that such a creative nature constitutes its key 
strength.  
A type of qualitative research is open-ended questions that organizational researchers 
often use to explore, explain, and/or reconfirm existing ideas (Jackson & Trochim, 2002). Open-
ended survey responses are often used in organizational research to gather new information about 
a topic (Sproull, 1988). By asking open-ended questions we did not constrain our respondents to 
a limited set of answers. While the first two questions mostly yielded a “yes” or “no” answers, 
the third question, which asked the participants to elaborate on what they felt was particular about 
the family firm targets, resulted in a richer qualitative data. 
Data Collection 
A survey of the entire population of private equity firms that acquired Western-European 
companies between 2000 and 2008 and were covered by the Mergermarket database was 
conducted from October 2008 to December 2008. The study is based on 14 phone interviews and 
140 written responses, followed up with 5 face-to-face and an additional phone interview with 
experts. Dillman (2000) suggests that surveys must be tailored in method and design to suit the 
nature of the business and the type of information sought, and that an appropriate mixture of 
communication modes such as mail, e-mail, Internet, telephone, and interview may be necessary 
to reach a difficult-to-access population. 
Questionnaires were sent to several locations for any private equity firm, resulting in 154 
responses representing 138 private equity firms. The number of private equity firms worldwide is 
approximately 2,140 (Thomson Reuters, 2007). Thus, this research represents opinions of about 
6.4% of private equity firms globally. The European Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association counts 950 members; the respondents to our survey constitute about 14.5% of all 
European private equity firms.  
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Every e-mail was personalized to achieve a better response rate (Heerwegh, 2005): a 
personal salutation was included, and a local language text was inserted when possible. 
Respondents were presented with a definition of a family firm and then asked three open-ended 
questions. Please refer to the Appendix for the questionnaire. 
Phone interviews were mostly conducted in English. The proportion of languages 
represented in the written responses is as follows: Italian (2.9%), French (12.1%), German 
(22.1%), and English (62.9%). The respondents hold senior positions in their companies. Most of 
them are investment managers or directors, but a large portion of responses are from partners, 
managing directors and CEOs. There are only 13 female respondents in the sample (8.4%). Such 
small proportion is representative of the population. Female professionals represent less than 10% 
of senior-level executives and deal-makers in the traditionally male-dominated field of private 
equity (Elizabeth Falk, founder of the Women’s Private Equity Summit, 2008). Also, 7% of the 
respondents have a PhD degree. 
Content Analysis 
To analyze the final question concerning family firm characteristics we employed the 
content analysis technique. This class of methods lies at the intersection of the qualitative and the 
quantitative approaches (Duriau, Reger, & Pfarrer, 2007) and has been described as appropriate 
for rigorous exploration of many important but difficult-to-study issues of interest to management 
researchers (Carley, 1993; Morris, 1994). Exploratory and interpretive research is more likely to 
rely on primary data such as interviews, field notes, videotapes, and open-ended questions to 
surveys (Duriau et al., 2007). 
We used the emergent coding technique. Emergent coding is defined as an approach to 
classify individuals’ open-ended responses whereby a coding scheme is established after 
collecting all responses.  
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We adopted a four-stage interpretive approach to the manual classification of open-ended 
responses suggested by Taber (1991). In the first or the analytic stage, both researchers identified 
the themes. In the second or the inductive stage, we separately sorted and re-sorted themes into 
categories in such a way that all the themes in one category had some commonality and were 
different to those in other categories. The next stage or the interpretive stage involved 
discussions. Here, we aimed to refine categories until there was an agreement about the final set. 
Eleven categories were developed. In the last or the verification stage, we verified if categories 
were clearly defined and if they were distinctive from one another. In case of a disagreement, the 
theme was discussed and then assigned into a category. We made sure that each of us clearly 
understood every category. 
As a next step, we conducted systematic content analysis by applying coding scheme (list 
of categories) to the responses (Neuendorf, 2002). Coding was performed autonomously by both 
authors. In coding the interviews, we assigned a maximum of three codes to each piece of related 
sentence fragment or a “thought unit” (Currall, Hammer, Baggett, & Doniger, 1999). We allowed 
for multiple codes because we found that even small thought units could easily be assigned to 
multiple categories (Klein, Ziegert, Knight, & Xiao, 2007, approached this issue in the same 
way). Prior to analyzing data, all discrepancies in coding were reconciled. We discussed all the 
points where we had divergent opinions and finally came up with frequencies for each category. 
To further validate our findings, in-depth expert interviews were carried out. The goal of 
this step was to clarify and broaden our understanding of private equity firms’ perception of 
family firm targets. During this phase, we interviewed 6 additional private equity professionals. 
The interviews lasted 30 minutes on average. We explained to interviewees that we had 
conducted prior research on private equity firms’ perception of family firms and were interested 
in knowing whether our preliminary conclusions were on target. We gave interviewees brief 
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verbal and written overviews of the tentative conclusions drawn from the previous phase of the 
research. We then explained to and asked the interviewees, “We want to know if we have this 
right. What do you think of this description of family firms? Is there anything you would change 
or amend?” Verifying one’s findings and interpretations with the incumbents of the setting is a 
commonly recommended strategy for an exploratory research (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Perlow, 
1998; Pratt, 2000). 
Experts agreed to 68% of our family firm characteristics. We came up with this number 
by independently reading interview transcripts and registering whether experts agreed to each of 
our categories. During the interview we did not limit ourselves to the discussion of the list of 
characteristics of a family firm target (i.e. categories). We also asked several questions designed 
to yield additional information, to understand relative importance of different characteristics, and 
to discuss our preliminary analysis of the results. All face-to-face interviews were audio-taped 
and later transcribed verbatim. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Results 
Exactly one half of the respondents stated that they distinguished between family-firm and 
non-family firm targets. However, only one third replied that this difference influenced the price. 
In most cases, this perception had a negative influence on valuation of the family firm targets. 
One of the interviewees commented, “…overall this means family businesses often trade at a 
significant discount, but this is not because they are family businesses...it is because family 
businesses often adopt business and management practices which can only work in a family 
environment” (#148). The private equity companies which did not observe any difference often 
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commented that they use general valuation criteria, and whether a target is a family or a non-
family firm does not have any significance. This is in line with the findings by Dawson (2008) 
who stated that private equity investors attribute greater importance to criteria that are not family-
related.  
The following table presents the most common themes and their frequencies. 
<<Insert Table 1 about here>> 
From the table it appears that family firms are generally perceived to be risky investments. 
Also, the process of acquiring family firms differs from that of non-family firms. The next table 
presents evidence for each of the characteristics. 
<<Insert Table 2 about here>> 
Analysis 
We have decided to focus on the main issue: the riskiness of family firm targets. Private 
equity firms perceive family firms to be riskier than non-family companies. Higher riskiness 
surfaced as the main theme throughout the interviews. The riskier an investment, the lower the 
price an investor is willing to pay for any expected return identical to that offered by a less risky 
investment. As expected, the correlation coefficient between the characteristic “Higher risk 
investment” and the question “Do you have a reason to pay more or less for a family firm 
target?” turned out to be negative and significant (-0.461, p-value<0.05). This suggests that those 
who believe family firms to be riskier investments tend to assign lower values to these firms. In 
other words, private equity firms adjust for risk by lowering price. However, this does not imply 
that if an investor analyzes a potential target and flags it as a family firm he or she would 
automatically apply a discount. This finding is about family-firm specific risks that could 
potentially influence the valuation. Apart from adjusting for the riskiness with price, counterparty 
risk can be mitigated by a proper deal structure. One of the private equity professionals 
 74 
commented, “[Family firms] can … cheat the books and show profits that are not there in 
reality. The deal can be structured in the following manner to avoid this. If the price of a 
company is 100, you give to the family 85 and put 15 in an escrow account. If after 6 months, the 
results are like they have to be, the family gets its 15. If you propose such a deal to a family and 
then you see them nervous, you know that there is something wrong.” (#118) Experts commented 
on the differences between an escrow account (established to mitigate the risk of untrue 
representations and warranties made by the seller) and an earn-out provision (established to 
assure that the firm will achieve financial goals as promised by the seller). Whereas escrow 
accounts are used to avoid risks connected to the firm’s past and present, earn-outs are linked to 
the future. The latter provision serves to bridge the gap between buyer’s and seller’s valuations of 
the target’s future profitability. Another interviewee mentioned the importance of keeping a 
minority ownership in the family during the period of investment: “We would buy 100% in case 
of a big corporation spin-off / secondary [buyout], but between 75% and 90% in case of a family 
firm. The family has to hold the remaining 10-25% in order to be stimulated to collaborate with 
the PE." (#120) One of the respondents mentioned the inclusion of a “broken deal” clause in the 
letter of intent since, according to some of the interviewees, families are more inclined to change 
their minds midst transaction. It would be fair to note however that these conventions are not 
exclusive to family firm buyouts. For example, it is common for an acquired firm’s management 
to get an equity stake in portfolio companies (Kaplan & Stroemberg, 2009). Also, earn-outs have 
always served as a risk management tool in private equity deals (Parnass, 2009). 
Regarding other characteristics, several experts noted that some of them were not really 
family business related, but were rather associated with the size of the business. One of the 
experts noted, “That is more the question of scale” (E2). In fact, academic literature often finds 
small businesses to demonstrate the same characteristics that private equity professionals used in 
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order to describe family firms. For example, poor managerial competence was found to be more 
common in small businesses by Jennings and Beaver (1997). This can be partially explained by 
lower levels of training and development (Loan-Clarke, Boocock, Smith, & Whittaker, 1999). 
Watkins (1983) found that small business owners do not see the need to implement even the most 
basic management practices. Also, there is a lower need for MIS in small firms since the owner-
manager is often not convinced of necessary procedures to monitor performance (Fuller-Love, 
2006). “Dominance of single individuals”, one of the characteristics suggested in the study, is 
also an issue faced by small firms since the owners often wish to retain control of all aspects of 
the business (Fuller-Love, 2006). To some extent, the characteristic “Family before business 
interests” is also found in small businesses. According to Ang (1991), small firms show higher 
integration of personal and business affairs than large companies. Because of these similarities, 
private equity professionals may equate family firms to small businesses. To some extent, this 
may be connected to the empirical evidence that although family firm buyouts contributed to 
38% of the number of all European buyouts, they only represented 11% of the total value. This 
further underlines the fact that family firms are generally smaller than other types of buyouts 
(Scholes, Wright, Westhead, Bruining, & Kloeckner, 2009). Finally, while not necessarily a 
characteristic of a small business, lower growth has been documented to take place in family 
firms led by either the subsequent generations or the older entrepreneurs (Westhead, Cowling, & 
Howorth, 2001). Inclination to preserve wealth and aversion to risk connected with exploring 
new wealth-creation opportunities are probably the main reasons for this (Goossens et al., 2008). 
Most family firm characteristics that emerged from the research seem to be indicative of 
weaknesses. However, these weaknesses correspond to the measures that active investors such as 
private equity firms undertake. Jensen (1989) and other proponents of leveraged buyouts argue 
that private equity firms improve firm operations and create economic value by applying 
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financial, governance and operational engineering. Consequently, the shortcomings of family 
firms may be overcome through active management by the private equity firm. This, in turn may 
represent an untapped potential. Scholes et al. (2009) noted that as a precondition for investment 
by a private equity firm in a buyout, they need to perceive that there would be upside gains from 
investing in the deal. Scholes and colleagues further noted that private equity practitioners indeed 
appreciate that some private family firms have an untapped potential. Accordingly, the issue of 
lack of management information systems can be solved by their introduction. Indeed, the level of 
professionalism in a family firm was found to increase following a buy-out (CMBOR, 2007). The 
financial inefficiency problem can be settled by reorganizing operations. Previous literature 
found private equity-backed transactions to streamline organizational processes, reduce 
workforce and decrease unit costs (Harris, Siegel, & Wright, 2005; Meuleman et al., 2009; 
Wright, Hoskisson, & Busenitz, 2000). As to the issue of lower levels of growth, previous 
literature has suggested that buyouts stimulate growth opportunity realizations (Meuleman et al., 
2009; Wright et al., 2000). This goal is often achieved by taking on more debt. Lower levels of 
debt in family firms, as documented in previous literature (Gallo & Villaseca, 1996), should be a 
motivating factor for private equity investors. Since a buyout is typically financed with 60% to 
90% debt (Kaplan & Stroemberg, 2009), private equity firms can exercise more liberty in 
implementing the leverage in businesses that had incurred lower levels of debt in the past.  
The only weakness that is not easily corrected is poor management, especially if managers 
occupy dominant positions in the firm. There is a considerable amount of human resources risk 
involved in such transactions. Krishnan, Miller and Judge (1997) empirically found that the lower 
the turnover among the acquired firm top management team, the better the post acquisition 
performance. Hence, private equity firms will not feel comfortable acquiring poor management 
team which would need to be substituted quickly. However, even this problem may be partially 
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resolved by enhancing management team with more competent members. Private equity firms 
may provide resources and capabilities that management teams lack (Meuleman et al., 2009; 
Zahra & Filatochev, 2004) in the form of financial and strategic advice (Sapienza, Manigart, & 
Vermeir, 1996). They may also provide contacts and professional development of management 
(EVCA Report, 2005). Previous research found that private equity investors do not hesitate to fire 
poorly performing managers (Kaplan & Stroemberg, 2009). One third of such managers are 
replaced within the first 100 days  while the rest are replaced at some point during the deal 
(Acharaya, Hahn & Kehoe, 2009). Private equity firms may also specify contractual restrictions 
on the behavior of remaining managers (Wood & Wright, 2009).  
Conclusions 
Family firms play a crucial role in economies around the world.  A large number of these 
firms are facing succession issues. However, many do not have the resources and capabilities to 
go through with intergenerational succession. Surprisingly, the topic of succession outside the 
family has been understudied; however, it seems to be gaining momentum. Private equity firms 
represent an important class of acquirers. Their role in family firm succession has been 
recognized by regulators who have concluded that buy-out financing has a potential to facilitate 
generational change in family firms (European Commission, 2006). Without any doubt, the topic 
is also interesting to practitioners. The fact that 161 busy private equity professionals agreed to 
devote their time to the research speaks in favour of extending further work in this direction. 
Academic research has consistently found the salience of the issue to be consistently associated 
with higher response rates (Baruch, 1999; Cycyota & Harrison, 2006; Heberlein & Baumgartner, 
1978; Roth & BeVier, 1998; Tomaskovic-Devey, Leiter, & Thompson, 1994). Therefore, the 
topic of private equity investments in family firms merits occupying its well-deserved place in 
academic minds and journals. 
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Our survey results revealed that one half of the private equity professionals would flag the 
fact that a potential acquisition target is a family firm. However, this difference between a family 
and a non-family firm translated into valuation only for a third of interviewed professionals. The 
ones that would value a family firm differently lean towards negative valuation. To some extent, 
such inclination is explained by the higher degree of risk attributed to family firm targets. Further 
research on the particularities of the acquisition process and deal structures would be of interest. 
Also, studies that focus on mitigating family-firm specific risks as well as enhancing deeper 
understanding of particular risks need to be undertaken. 
Implications for Research  
By content analyzing responses instead of having private equity professionals answer via 
a fixed response format, we were able to elicit information about investments in family firms in 
greater depth and detail. Our analysis identified numerous issues that can be studied in future 
research using a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods, thus increasing the 
potential to explore the generalization of these results across different geographies and investors. 
Data collected from open-ended responses are often not intended for analysis but are used for 
developing other questions (Anderson & Shaw, 1999). We believe that many questions were 
raised here. Why are family firms perceived to be riskier targets than non-family firms? What can 
be done to resolve this? Is it because of risk that almost one third of the respondents indicated 
that they would value the family firm at a discount? Even though correlation between the two 
attributes in our study clearly showed this, a larger scale research, with a method more suited for 
quantitative data analysis, should be carried out. 
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Implications for Practice 
More emphasis should be put on the understudied topic of family firm acquisitions. 
Family firms make up a particular class of acquisition targets, and hence deserve a special 
approach. Further research will benefit potential family firm acquirers who would be able to 
better handle investments in family firms. Also, family firms can get a better understanding of 
how they are perceived by potential acquirers and consequently improve their preparation for the 
sale process. From the current study, it appears that family firms should increase transparency of 
their businesses. In part, this can be achieved by introducing management information systems 
and outlining responsibilities within the firm, a move that would possibly involve hiring an 
external manager. As previously discovered by Dawson (2009), private equity companies prefer 
family firms that are professionally managed. Hiring an external manager would not only add to 
the perception of a firm as being “professionally managed” but would also diminish reliance on 
single individuals and make investors more confident about smoother transfer of ownership. 
Scholes et al. (2009) have suggested that involving non-family managers should result in 
improved efficiency leading to increase in the firm’s value pre-buyout.  
Additionally, hiring an external advisor would help both parties drive more easily through 
the process. Experts who have commented on the topic of lower professionalism displayed by 
family firms during the acquisition process noted that it is not true that families are less 
professional sellers, but that they often do not have good advisors. An external party may also 
help overcome emotions and underline realistic expectations regarding family firm’s worth. In 
addition, an advisor could help resolve family conflicts before making a firm available for sale. 
However, the use of prestigious financial institutions and auditors lead to costs that may offset, to 
some extent, the benefit of reduced underpricing (Hutchinson, 1999).  
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Contributions 
We hope that our findings and conclusions will inspire new studies on private equity 
investments in family firms as well as on alternative succession routes. For decades, studies on 
succession have focused on succession from within the family. Given that a large number of 
families exit their businesses, the topic of alternative succession routes demands further 
conceptual and empirical analysis. We also believe that our study contributes to the 
understanding of family firm perception by third parties. Further research on how external groups 
such as investors and customers view this unique type of organization is justified. 
Limitations 
Limitations of our research are connected to the methodology adopted in this study, and to 
the fact that our results may have been subjected to interpretation bias. Coding decisions made by 
researchers can pose threats to the reliably and validity of the results (Krippendorff, 1980; Seidel 
& Kelle, 1995). Furthermore, researchers can argue that since our conclusions are derived from 
self-reported sources, they are not an adequate representation of reality (Dawson, 2009). We 
would like to argue that our method is appropriate, because of the exploratory nature of our study 
and also because we were looking to make statements about how actors interpret reality, not 
about the reality itself. Without doubt, a different method and approach to this topic may bring 
additional insights and may potentially change some of our conclusions. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Family Firm Target Characteristics: Numbers 
Family Firm Target Characteristic Freq. 
% of  
total 
% of those  
who see 
difference 
Higher risk investment 51 33% 66% 
Acquisition process & deal structure differ 42 27% 55% 
Emotions & intuition 35 23% 46% 
Family before business interests 31 20% 40% 
Poor management & lower quality managers 29 19% 38% 
Poor transparency & need more due-diligence 27 18% 35% 
Less MIS and formal structures 24 16% 31% 
Complicated shareholder structure & conflicts inside family 17 11% 22% 
Dominance of single individuals or very small groups 16 10% 21% 
Financially inefficient & lower levels of growth 15 10% 20% 
Long-term orientation 12 8% 16% 
 
Table 2. Family Firm Target Characteristics: Evidence 
Family Firm Target 
Characteristic 
Evidence 
Higher risk investment "There is risk involved in a family deal that the family takes money, leaves and business 
stops." (#4) 
"Businesses with extensive family involvement tend to have greater human resources 
risks and transition risks than those that have been “more professionally” managed". 
(#40) 
"...risk / uncertainty in the decision-making when dealing with family members". (#50) 
"it tends to be more difficult to implement change in family businesses...so harder to 
drive out the value". (#107) 
"...the risk that it will be difficult to change a culture..." (#110) 
"...risk of hidden facts..."(#125) 
Acquisition process & 
deal structure differ 
"A family business sale can be cancelled last minute, because the owning family has 
changed its mind." (#5) 
"[Family] is a negotiating tool more than anything, as it gives you certain flexibility with 
regards to pricing". (#59) 
"...selling process of a family firm is less public, i.e. it is not conducted through an open 
auction". (#69) 
"...selling professionalism is less developed than by corporations". (#99) 
"...a PE firm can include certain non-cash elements in a transaction which a family 
values, whereas the actual cash price might be less than what a corporate seller would 
require...Family firms ... are more interested to understand who they are dealing with... 
We value having more time to access information, and to have less competition when 
looking at a particular target.". (#105) 
"The family has to hold ...10-25% in order to be stimulated to collaborate with the PE. 
(#120) 
"Family firm deals are much tougher. You have to give reassurance to the family". 
(#144) 
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Emotions & intuition "The owners of family firms involve more emotions when they decide about the price…" 
(#12) 
"Higher loyalty to the company, often more than just financial commitment". (#93) 
"...non-formal indicators of level of activity and financial health ... (vision of the rhythm 
of work of employees, the mood of any particular key employee)..." (#108) 
"...discussion is usually connected with more emotions, more irrational thinking..." 
(#124) 
"Families are emotionally involved with their companies: that is why usually the sale of 
the business would be the last solution for sourcing the money for some other needs". 
(#144) 
"The family management knows their company and the industry so well that decisions 
are often taken following their instinct".(#146) 
Family before business 
interests 
"...privilege to family members…" (#55) 
"...family business ...often sees its interests confused with those of individuals who 
control it" (#89) 
"...management that can handle in family and not in company’s best interest (e.g. 
arbitration salaries / dividends)..."(#108) 
"A family extracts value from the company in form of salaries and using company’s 
assets in family purposes...Families run the business to finance the family". (#118) 
"...earnings depressed by "family" expenses..." (#151) 
Poor management & 
lower quality  
managers 
"As a rule, I would say family businesses are not as well run as corporates". (#66) 
"...the management of these businesses is less professional than non-family companies, as 
management positions tend to not necessarily be filled according to the managerial 
competence". (#89) 
"...less 'sophisticated' (perhaps sticking to tried and tested practices)" (#109) 
"...family managers [are of a] lower quality, because they come to firm on managerial 
position without recruitment process, so that means it is a big chance they have no 
adequate qualification, experiences from previous jobs or they are less suitable for 
concrete position...".(#125)  
"More often than not feuds and internal conflicts result in a business being mismanaged 
or decisions being poor or delayed". (#145) 
Poor transparency & 
need more  
due-diligence 
"...a greater potential for the information asymmetry. Once the meeting is finished, the 
private equity goes home and discussion stops for it, but not inside the family". (#4) 
"The lack of professional investors means you can see some very strange reporting 
metrics and processes and often there will be a lot of skeletons in the closet ..." (#41)  
"We would certainly flag an opportunity if it was a family firm for additional due 
diligence on the dynamics of the relationships". (#50) 
"...the distribution of power is usually different from that displayed on the official 
organizational chart". (#89) 
"In family firms, one cannot see from financial accounts what the real company’s 
potential is...A private equity has to reconstruct accounts, because actual numbers are 
prepared for fiscal authorities and do not display the real value...The due diligence of a 
family firm has to be done with the major degree of suspicion. Families are always 
smarter than private equities". (#118) 
"...you always need to be careful with the quality of accounting and controls in family 
businesses and also at the process for hiring, assessing and promoting people, also need 
to understand if there will be an impact of reducing the family involvement in the 
business..." (#148) 
Less management 
information systems 
(MIS) and formal 
structures 
"...sometimes they have poorly developed management and reporting structures.  The 
reason can be that the owning family had no interest in institutionalized management 
structure for a long time". (#53) 
"...they have an insufficient financial reporting systems, lack enterprise reporting systems 
(e.g. SAP)". (#54) 
"...in the non-family firms there is more reporting..." (#86) 
"Flexible structures in the family firm (one person often performs different functions)". 
(#120) 
Complicated "It typically faces complex structures, especially after many generations" (#54) 
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shareholder structure & 
conflicts inside family 
"...multiple family members involved there are often different interests of family 
members or [family branches] in place. This makes a transaction more difficult". (#63) 
"You try negotiating with a the shareholders when they're all inter-related and you'll soon 
find out that doing a deal from a family is usually a nightmare...shares spread amongst 
ill-informed opinionated family members who don't agree that the deal being offered is 
fair...". (#81) 
"There are sometimes disagreements between shareholders, for various reasons (often 
larger than the business) that can complicate or even jeopardize the future of a company". 
(#83) 
Dominance of single 
individuals or very 
small groups 
"...the dependence on single persons. This is potentially higher by family firms". (#12) 
"...the change in control is often problematic due to the dominant status of the previous 
owners." (#90) 
"...structurally are tailored to a strong leader/patriarch with all the pluses/minuses". (#91) 
"Family firms are often autocratically run: one person decides everything...Even if an 
outside CEO is employed, he has to report to the family member, who will take the final 
decision. The inability to guide the strategic development of a business is often the 
reason why good CEOs do not want to work for a family firm".(#146) 
Financially inefficient & 
lower levels of growth 
"They do not move once a “point of comfort” is reached". (#4) 
"Family run businesses tend to be less efficient – whether it is on expenses (higher cost); 
or in strategy (very opinionated and stuck in tradition)". (#7) 
"Often family firms are not the most aggressive in driving growth". (#101) 
"Family businesses tend to be more risk adverse and therefore less likely to have the 
skills within them to make acquisitions or expand geographically". (#104) 
"I would expect family-owned firms to have more inefficiencies..."(#105) 
"...often lacked capital to expand internationally which means... untapped expansion 
opportunities". (#151) 
Long-term orientation "Family firms have a longer history. This means they are more robust, they survived 
through different cycles". (#4)  
"They invest enough, because they have a vision on a future". (#39) 
"...long term view on strategy, trusted partners, often well-invested and property rich 
which improves asset backing..."(#41) 
"...better position in their market, because they can follow long-term strategies and take 
care about the customers not the capital markets".(#48) 
"...long-term management and hence better quality assets, customer relationship 
management". (#55) 
"Family businesses are inherently more durable, stronger, with long-term projects and 
sometimes longer investment cycles". (#108) 
 
APPENDIX 
Questionnaire 
Definition: Family firm is a company in which multiple members of the same family are involved 
as major owners or top managers, either contemporaneously or over time. 
1. Do you distinguish between family- and non-family firms when analyzing your targets? 
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2. Imagine you have two privately-held companies equal in every respect with the only 
difference that the one is a family firm and the other not: do you have a reason to pay 
more (positive difference, premium) or less (negative, discount) for a family firm target? 
3. What is this difference due to? What particular traits does a family firm have that translate 
in a premium or discount? 
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Abstract: This study contributes to an under-researched yet highly important topic for both 
academia and practitioners, the alternative succession routes for family firms. Results of the 
survey among the US-American private equity professionals revealed that family firms are 
perceived as riskier targets than their non-family counterparts and that this may influence their 
valuation. Risk-mitigating measures and other outcomes of the perceptions of family firms as 
higher risk targets are discussed. Implications for theory and practice are shared in the final 
section. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although traditionally family firm literature was almost exclusively dedicated to the topic 
of intra-family succession and was seeing a sale of a family firm as a failure, finally we can find 
some academic researchers arguing that both keeping and selling the business could be viable 
success options for business families (Dana & Smyrnios, 2010). In fact, a high number of 
families around the world is actually considering to sell (Halter, Schrettle, & Baldegger, 2009; 
Gow, 2007; Smyrnios & Dana, 2006, 2007). One size does not fit all: some families want and can 
be passed onto multiple generations, while others may be unwilling or unable to do so. In fact, 
empirical research suggested that some owners may perceive that there are no suitable family 
members to whom ownership and leadership can be transferred (Wright, Thompson, & Robbie, 
1992; Bierly, Ng, & Godfrey, 1999).  Accordingly, for some business families an exit can be a 
positive choice (Birley et al., 1999). Closure of a business should not be equated to a failure. It 
can be a consequence of retirement, more attractive alternative opportunities, or sale of the 
business for profit (Stokes & Blackburn, 2001). Often, family business owners use the term “pass 
along” to mean both transferring ownership to the next generation and selling the firm to pass 
along the wealth created by the business (Vought, Baker, & Smith, 2008). Although academia 
finally recognized that a sale of a family firm is a viable option, there is still very little research 
covering alternative succession routes. Family businesses sale is a part of the universe that is 
nearly missing from the family business research (Scholes, Wright, Westhead, Burrows, & 
Bruining, 2007; Vought et al., 2008). It would be fair to cover all the options available to family 
firms. This need is reinforced by the growing tendency to sell family firms. Investment 
professionals perceive family firms to be a very hot market in terms of the number of deals 
(Reinebach, 2007) and 38% of European buyouts in 2007 targeted family firms (CMBOR, 2007). 
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Additional research would also aid business families in making a decision about which 
succession route to select and help them prepare for a sale should they choose not to pass the firm 
on to the next generation. On the other hand, it is possible that acquirers are not aware of 
distinctiveness of family firms and hence additional research will aid them in better handling 
their deals. 
This paper reports a study of private equity professionals’ attitude towards family firm 
targets and is one of the very few articles trying to understand acquirers’ perception of family 
firms. The objectives of the study were threefold. First, it was intended to further develop the 
qualitative findings from a exploratory study on family firm targets’ perception by private equity 
firms (Granata & Gazzola, 2010) that was aimed to open up a discussion about family firms as 
acquisition targets. The most prominent characteristic from the previous study was higher 
riskiness of the family firm targets. Consequently, a major attention was given to the exploration 
of this trait, as well as better understanding of its consequences and mitigating measures private 
equity firms employ. Second, it is hoped that the results will provide members of the private 
equity community, as well as other financial and strategic acquirers, with an aggregate picture of 
family firms and in particular outline risks associated with this type of targets. Finally, this study 
should help selling families pinpoint their weaknesses, take the steps necessary to improve them 
and consequently be able to negotiate a higher valuation. 
METHODOLOGY 
Survey is, by far, the most common method of data collection in several fields, and is 
anticipated to remain such at least for sometime in the future (Aaker, Kumar, & Day, 1995; 
Chadwick, Bahr, & Albrecht, 1984; Malhotra, 1993; Simsek & Veiga, 2000; Synodinos & 
Brennan, 1988). Gathering data via surveys has several weaknesses relative to experimental 
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methods, however it has remained prevalent in the management research due to relatively higher 
costs and complexities connected to performing experiments and because surveys may be a better 
fit for many research questions (Simsek & Veiga, 2000). As to Zikmund (1994), if you want to 
find out what managers are thinking, you need to ask them. The objective of the research was 
exactly this: to understand what private equity professionals think about family firm targets and 
how their perceptions influence their behavior (i.e. valuation, length of the process, risk-
mitigating measures). 
The questionnaire was created using the findings from a previous author’s research 
(Granata & Gazzola, 2010). The study was organized in the following steps. The initial draft of 
the questionnaire was discussed in-depth during face-to-face conversations with eight experts. 
This step served a twofold purpose. First, I wanted to examine if respondents understood all the 
items in the way I meant them to be understood. Second, experts suggested additional items. 
Although, all the suggestions were very valuable, I only stuck to additional items that 
corresponded to the purpose of the research. The following individuals were involved as experts: 
two private equity professionals, one consultant to private equity firms, two family business and 
one entrepreneurship professors, one private equity post-doc researcher, as well as one 
professional survey consultant. The questionnaire was then pilot tested in two stages. In the first 
stage, testing was performed with nine PhD and post-doc students. This time rather than using 
face-to-face communication, I asked them to fill out questionnaire in the electronic form, the 
media that I was going to use for the final study. Doctoral and post-doctoral students’ comments 
mostly concerned wording and scale issues and were critical for the final development of the 
questionnaire. The scale items were then reworded based on their feedback and distributed to the 
participants of the last testing stage that included 23 undergraduate and MBA participants of the 
family business course at The Wharton School. This step gave me a glance of what the results 
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may look like in the actual study. In addition, final version was tested for the time expense. The 
responses from both pilot tests were not included in the final analyses. 
The survey instrument consisted of 13 major questions relating to various family firm 
targets’ risks, risk-mitigating measures, valuation, investment process and familiarity with the 
family firm targets. Respondents were asked both if they perceived family firms to be riskier than 
non-family counterparts, as well as a series of questions about types of risk that are possibly 
connected with investing in a family firm. I also invited respondents to specify the most 
important risk out of all the proposed, as well as suggest any additional risks that were not listed. 
Next questions concerned risk-mitigating measures such as certain contractual provisions and 
various types of due diligence. In line with the previous study, I introduced a question about 
valuation. Exploratory study (Granata & Gazzola, 2010) on which the current research is based 
found several family firm characteristics that seemed to be rather weaknesses. However, they 
appear to be well-matching to post-acquisition improvements implemented by such active 
investors as private equity firms. This could suggest that family firms may offer an upside 
potential. To elaborate on this finding, I brought in a series of items connected to investors’ 
actions and asked to what extent these items were relevant. Further questions dealt with the 
length of process and whether a family firm was rather a turnaround situation. Turnaround firms 
are defined as ones that were once profitable but are now earning less than their cost of capital 
(Macdonald, 1992). This item came up after discussing findings from the previous study at an 
international conference. Presented with rather a negative picture of family firms, participants 
hypothesized that it may be the case that only “bad” family firms are sold, while the “good” ones 
stay in family hands. An analogy can be drawn with the venture capital literature. It was noted 
that adverse selection was an issue: better ventures were presumed to resort to cheaper sources of 
financing such as debt, while those who were not good enough to obtain the debt financing would 
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rely on venture capitalists (Koryak & Smolarski, 2008). Finally, a question regarding the degree 
of familiarity with the family firms closed the survey. Its purpose was to find out whether more 
knowledge about family firms translated in some particular pattern of answers. However, it 
should be noted that only private equity professionals with at least some degree of familiarity 
participated in the research, so there was not too much variability on this item. Indeed, this was 
the scope of the study: to learn about perceptions of investment professionals who have 
experience with family firms. Please refer to the Appendix for the full version of the 
questionnaire. 
Answers were measured using a 7-point Likert-type rating scale (i.e. Osgood, Suci, & 
Tannenbaum’s (1957) scale). Although omitting a central point on a scale (i.e. even number of 
points) eliminates "easy outs" and makes respondents take sides on an issue, offering a middle 
alternative maximizes data quality. O'Muircheartaigh, Krosnick and Helic (2000) found that in 
this way the amount of random measurement error is reduced and hence reliability is increased, 
while the validity of attitude measurements remains unaffected. In addition, respondents may not 
be able to agree or disagree if they perceive that their opinions are in exact balance, so offering a 
middle point may indeed provide more honest answers (Fowler, 1995). Scales with 5 to 8 points 
provided the greatest agreement between people rating the same set of objects and the lowest 
susceptibility to context effects (Finn, 1972; O'Muircheartaigh et al., 2000; Schwarz & Wyer, 
1985; Wedell & Parducci, 1988; Wedell, Parducci, & Lane, 1990). Within 5 to 8 points interval 
there are two alternatives offering a middle point (i.e. 5- and 7-point scales). The longer one was 
preferred because a higher number of points allows respondents to have finer distinctions in 
terms of attitudes and hence should offer more information about differences between people and 
increase the variance of subject responses (O'Muircheartaigh et al., 2000). 
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To assist the private equity professionals in making their choices, each point on the scale 
was named. Hopefully, this also helped enhance consistency in interpretation by not letting 
respondents assign their own meaning to the value. 
Electronic survey was chosen because private equity professionals is a population of 
executives who is spending a lot of time in meetings or traveling to potential targets, current 
investee companies and limited partners. An electronic questionnaire can be answered at one’s 
convenience, so for the sake of time constraints of this difficult to reach executives’ population 
this way of communication was preferred. In addition, electronic surveying has several attractive 
features for researchers such as easy data management, location flexibility, and rapid diffusion 
(Simsek & Veiga, 2000). 
DATA 
The whole population of the US-American buyout firms listed on the Private Equity Info 
website was considered for this study. The survey was administered between March and April 
2010. Questionnaire was sent to 1,018 e-mail addresses, 916 of which were personal addresses of 
private equity professionals. Where there was no possibility to retrieve a personal e-mail, request 
was sent to a general address of a private equity firm. Although questionnaire was anonymous, I 
highly suspect that the general address enquiries produced a very low number of responses, if 
any. More than half of the survey participants contacted me back, but among the answers there 
was not a single one from private equity firms for which I only had a general enquiry e-mail 
address. As to Simsek and Veiga (2000), impersonal questionnaires are often thrown away before 
reaching the person who has the required information, because it is not always clear who should 
respond. Another reason is that the low-priority request such as participation in an academic 
study might be filtered out by an assistant receiving the e-mail. In addition, the delivery of 45 e-
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mails failed, 17 of them being general and the rest – personal e-mail addresses. Finally, 7 private 
equity professionals replied that the survey was not applicable to them and 2 refused to 
participate due to firm’s policies. Consequently, the adjusted number of population to whom 
enquiries were sent is 879
8
. 
A reminder was e-mailed several days before the deadline announced in the first 
invitation. Multiple contacts with potential respondents may increase the legitimacy of the survey 
and enhance the number of answers (Kanuk & Berenson, 1975; Porter, 2004). 
Only fully administered questionnaires were considered for the analysis. Usable responses 
were received from 145 private equity professionals yielding an overall response rate of 14.2% 
(16.5% if the adjusted number of the total population is considered). This response rate can be 
seen as quite a success since professionals interviewed were on the highest levels of management 
in their organization. Executives under the current pressures of running an organization were 
described as having less time and energy to spend on pro bono, low-priority behaviors such as 
survey completion (Cooper & Payne, 1988). Singh, Taneja and Mangalaraj (2009) commented 
that researchers seeking responses from executives should be prepared to mail out nearly twice as 
many surveys as they might plan to use for other populations for their study. 
Armstrong and Overton’s (1977) found that late respondents are more likely than early 
respondents to be similar to non-respondents. Answers were categorized into two sets based on 
when they were received. MANOVA tests were conducted to examine differences in responses 
received at different times. No significant differences were found between early and late 
respondents. Consequently, sample selection bias was not an issue in this study (Kanuk & 
Berenson, 1975; Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 2003). 
                                                 
8
 916 personal e-mail addresses – 28 failed personal e-mails – 7 not applicable – 2 refused. 
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DISCUSSION 
Results 
Private equity professionals rather agree than disagree that family firm acquisition targets 
bear higher risk than their non-family counterparts (mean = 4.53 on a 7-point scale from 1 = 
“Disagree Strongly” to 7 = “Agree Strongly”). The two most important risk types are 
management transition risk and culture transition risk (mean values 5.84 and 5.56 respectively). 
Both of them also have the two lowest standard deviations meaning that there was quite a high 
level of agreement among survey participants.  
<<Insert Graph 1 abot here>> 
An open-ended question aimed to reveal any additional family firm targets’ risks. Some of 
the comments actually confirmed the importance of the management and culture transition risks. 
One of the answers about the difficulty changing culture: “Legacy employees tend not to like the 
new leader. [It is] not easy to transform mom and pop businesses to professional, sophisticated 
corporate environment”. Several private equity professionals commented about what can be 
attributed to a management transition risk. The following issues were mentioned: “Concentration 
of knowledge and relationships with family members”, “need to build a team in the organization - 
especially in financial arena”, “owner starts competitive firm”. Additional risks concerning 
family dynamics included: “Personal issues between family members”, “family insider deals”, 
“family members in positions they are unqualified for”, “interference of inactive family 
members”, “the family makes decisions based on family politics and not data driven decisions”. 
Other  risk types mentioned were “family firms often place their trust in professional advisors 
that lack experience in these type of transactions”, “nobody listening to the PE Fund”, “risk of 
improper transactions with related companies“, “to ask them to listen to your advice and counsel 
is to ask them to go against the very grain of their nature and to ignore their historical 
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experience of being rewarded precisely because they do not listen to counsel”, “non-market 
transactions with suppliers or customers given personal history”. 
The next set of questions aimed at revealing how private equity professionals deal with 
family firm-specific risks. Due diligence for dynamics of relationship and team followed by 
financial due diligence seem to be the most important risk-mitigating measures undertaken by the 
private equity investors (mean values 5.69 and 5.29 respectively). The due diligence process was 
described as one wherein some party has to examine every detail of the operation, structure, 
ownership, assets or another issues related to a counterparty (De Cleyn & Braet, 2007). Koryak 
and Smolarski (2008) argued that it pays off to invest in revealing real risk-return profile of a 
potential investment and management capabilities of the target company to be acquired. High 
perceived riskiness of family firms is associated with greater reliance on different types of due 
diligence. In fact, the higher the perceived risk, the more checks are necessary. On the other hand, 
the question whether family firms earn a higher internal rate of return (IRR) is negatively 
correlated with all the due diligence types (correlation coefficient around -0.2 for all the three 
types of due diligence significant at the 0.05 level). This is somewhat contradictory: investments 
with a higher IRR usually bear a higher risk.  Apparently, if private equity investors perceive that 
an investment has a potential to have a higher IRR they are more optimistic and invest less time 
in pre-acquisition controls.  
Among the three contractual procedures, earn-out provision seems to be the least 
important when dealing with family firms (mean = 4.64), although there is rather an agreement 
than disagreement that there is more need for this contractual provision in acquisitions involving 
family firms. This form of an outcome-based contract is used to align agent’s incentives with the 
goals of the principals to induce desired action. Koryak and Smolarski (2008) argued that 
excessive reliance on these contracts may have managers engage in practices detrimental to an 
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organization. So, probably, it is a common practice in the private equity industry not to rely too 
heavily on the outcome-based contracts such as earn-outs. 
Almost all the risk-mitigating measures are positively and statistically significantly 
correlated with each other. This can be interpreted in the following way: private equity 
professionals who tend to think some measure is more important in family firm transactions 
generally tend to think so about several of the measures. All the three types of due diligence are 
correlated. This means that more of any type of due diligence means more due diligence in 
general. The connection is the strongest between financial and legal due diligence (.839**), while 
the other two correlation coefficients are around 0.4 significant at the 0.01 level.  
Open-ended question allowed respondents to list any additional risk-mitigating measures 
and explain reasons for them to be introduced. One of the crucial measures mentioned was a non-
compete agreement. Indeed, the risk that previous owner starts a competing firm was mentioned 
in additional risk types. Certainly, this is a profitable although not a fair strategy for a family firm 
owner. She or he receives money from an investor, starts another firm and persuades old 
customers that they become clients of a newly-established entity. This can sometimes be the case, 
because “often family owners have no other career skills”. In addition to a non-compete 
agreement, a thorough due diligence on relationships and dynamics of the team has to be 
performed. Special attention should be given to the motives to sell. If a true motive is other than 
retirement or start of a new venture in a different field, a private equity company needs to become 
alerted. One of the private equity professionals commented: “If one member is leaving and 
another is staying, get to the bottom of it”. Earn-out provision, as well as seller note were also 
recognized as necessary measures since the “link to ongoing success of the business is important 
and maybe more so than in traditional situations.” The need to keep “them invested in future 
success of business” is motivated by the fact that “family managers usually have the customer 
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relationships or an instinctive knowledge of the business that must be retained”. As mentioned 
above, transition risks were found to be the most important ones when dealing with a family firm 
target. This finding was mirrored in the following comment: “Transition plans must be iron clad 
and crystal clear and preferably written down if not contracted. All parties must agree on how a 
transition will occur - multiple times over”. Another private equity professional mentioned the 
need to discuss a “limited period for post-transaction employment of family members” in order to 
have “the flexibility to upgrade management”. 
Higher riskiness of family firm investments is negatively correlated with the valuation.  
<<Insert Graph 2 about here>> 
This means that private equity professionals perceiving family firms as riskier targets look 
to mitigate for this with the price. A linear regression of valuation item on the higher riskiness 
item, confirmed this hypothesis. Indeed, slope coefficient is negative and statistically significant. 
Adjusting for higher risk can also be handled with various risk-mitigating measures discussed 
above. In addition, one of the respondents mentioned that the discount can also be in terms of 
structure. The private equity professional mentioned that he or she would always want the family 
to own a stake in the business junior to his or her securities. 
An open question regarding reasons for a discount or premium revealed several 
interesting issues. Private equity professionals named the following reasons for a family firm 
discount: “Need to professionalize management team and organizational structure”; 
“management gap / lack of transition plan with family firm”, “difficult to replace founder / 
family member”, “higher probability of losing customers and employees” “great concern about 
the integrity of the seller and the associated risk of undisclosed liabilities”; “poor internal 
financial and information controls”, “more uncertainty regarding smooth transition”, “lack of 
professional systems, transparency, comfort of transition”, “longer expected time to closing and 
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higher uncertainty seller would actually sell”. These answers indicate that the main reasons for a 
discount are the need to replace management and the lack of infrastructure. Indeed, a 
respondent’s comment supports the latter: “Any discount is mainly due to the lack of 
infrastructure in the company which is why I would argue family firms typically trade at a 
discount.  That's not to say it is because it is a family firm, but because most of the family firms I 
have seen or acquired have lacked institutional infrastructure such as proper accounting systems, 
etc.” Some respondents admitted that they could negotiate a discount due to “less competition to 
acquire the target” or the fact that often family firms are “not as sophisticated in negotiations” 
and “will accept a discount in order to avoid an auction process”. It should be noted that three 
private equity professionals listed reasons to pay a premium for a family business. Two answers 
were connected to a higher upside potential, while the third attributed a higher valuation due to 
the fact that “younger generation taking over was well positioned to grow the business”. It can 
be argued however that the realization of the upside potential is a merit of private equity 
professionals and has its costs. Consequently, it is questionable if acquirers should pay a 
premium for such a target. Below, the topic of family firms’ upside potential is discussed further. 
The question regarding post-buyout actions was aimed at indicating if our proposition 
about family firms’ upside potential from the chapter 2 made sense. There we argued that the 
shortcomings of family firms may be overcome through active management by the private equity 
investors and represented an untapped potential.  I matched weaknesses of family firms from our 
exploratory research with actions aimed at improving them. The results of the survey suggest that 
our proposition may be true. The level of agreement was really high: all the actions had a mean 
above 4.7. Interestingly, the main reasons for discount, the need to replace management and the 
lack of infrastructure, coincided with the most popular post-buyout measures. “Improve the use 
of management information systems (MIS)” and “Enhance management team with more 
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competent members” have mean values of 6.18 and 6.15 correspondingly. This may be taken as a 
hint that family firms in fact offer some upside potential. However, before making a definite 
statement, a more profound research is necessary. 
Private equity professionals who perceive family firms as higher risk investments are also 
those for whom the investment period is longer (0.173*).  
<<Insert Graph 3 about here>> 
Family firm is an entity that comprises both family and business matters. Consequently, 
with twice as many issues to be analyzed due to higher riskiness the sale process takes longer. 
Indeed, the increased length is also connected to the additional due diligence to be performed. In 
fact, financial and legal due diligence are positively correlated to the length of the acquisition 
process (0.303** and 0.264** respectively). Previous academic studies noted that transfer of the 
family firm to the next generation is a lengthy process that may take up to 15 to 20 years (Dyck, 
Mauws, Starke, & Mischke, 2002; Handler, 1989; Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 2003; Vancil, 
1987; Ward, 1990). These findings may suggest that also another type of succession, the family 
firm sale, may take somewhat more time than an acquisition of a non-family target. 
Familiarity with family firms is not correlated with perception of family firms as riskier 
targets, neither is it correlated with any of risk types. A possible interpretation is that family firms 
are generally perceived as riskier targets and this perception is not dependent on the amount of 
experience of private equity professionals with this type of firms. This finding is further 
discussed in the Implication for Practice section. 
Cluster Analysis 
Cluster analysis was meant to reveal whether there are any broad types of private equity 
professionals, with common attitude towards family firm targets. A two cluster solution was 
adopted. The first cluster includes private equity professionals who perceive family business risks 
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to be higher and consequently see more need in risk-reducing measures and assign lower 
valuation to family businesses. They are also the ones who are undecided whether family firms 
are turnaround situations versus the second group who somewhat disagrees with this statement. 
Process length and familiarity with family firms are the same for both clusters. 
Another cluster analysis involved examination of the measures that private equity 
professionals undertake post-acquisition. Private equity professionals that invest more effort in 
their targets are those who are inclined to think that family firms are more likely to be turnaround 
investments. Indeed, a turnaround investment involves more work from the acquirer’s side as 
compared to a regular buyout. Familiarity, length of the acquisition process and valuation are the 
same for both clusters. 
Factor Analysis 
In order to explore whether there was a more general pattern underlying the responses of 
private equity professionals, the data was factor analyzed. Extraction was based on the 
Eigenvalue-greater-than-one rule (Kim & Mueller, 1978). Factors with Eigenvalues greater than 
one are considered significant, explaining an important amount of the variability in the data, 
while Eigenvalues less than one are considered too weak, not explaining a significant portion of 
the data variability. In addition to the Eigenvalue-greater-than-one rule, the scree test was 
employed to double-check the number of factors (Tucker, Koopman, & Linn, 1969). On the scree 
plot, the "elbow", i.e. the point at which the curve bends, is considered to indicate the maximum 
number of factors to extract. 
Analysis of risk types resulted in a two-factor solution (62.4% of the total variance 
explained). It revealed that the risk that owners back out of transaction stands out from other 
types. Factor one incorporates all but this risk type, while factor two contains only the risk that 
owners back out of transaction. This risk type can be hardly mitigated with any of the measures 
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that were included in the survey. In addition, it relates more than others to transaction itself rather 
than to target characteristics.  
Examination of risk-mitigating measures also resulted in a two-factor solution (62.1% of 
the total variance explained). Factor one is associated with a concern of preventing negative 
issues that can be identified through different kinds of due diligence pre-buyout or mitigated with 
an escrow account post-buyout. Factor two relates to stimulating collaboration from sellers’ side. 
Through an earn-out and a minority stake sellers should become interested that a company 
performs well post-buyout. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Contributions 
 Families represent a unique group of active owners that hold concentrated position in their 
firms for a long time. Throughout their ownership they create a set of distinctive resources, 
company’s value systems and organizational structures specific to family firms. Most of family 
firms do not manage to pass the ownership to the next generation and often sell their company to 
a third party. This paper unveiled perception of family firm targets by an important class of 
acquirers, private equity firms. 
This paper improves the understanding of family firms in several ways. Perhaps the most 
important finding from this study is that family firm targets are indeed perceived to be riskier by 
their acquirers and that this can have negative influence on the valuation. In addition, higher 
perceived risk was connected with a more intensive usage of risk-mitigating measures, and a 
different structuring of the deal (junior versus senior securities) was suggested. Consequently, the 
perception of risk, even though it may be different from the actual levels of risk, influences 
investors’ behavior. Second, evidence is provided that the two most important family firm 
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targets’ risks are connected to management and culture transition. Next, this study suggests that 
almost all the risk-reducing measures are correlated. A possible interpretation is that private 
equity professionals who think one of the measures is more relevant for family firms than for 
their non-family counterparts tend to think so about several measures. 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 This paper presented several interesting findings. However, several limitations should be 
noted. The use of cross-sectional data does not allow any causality inferences. Furthermore, 
being a continuation of a study of Western-European investors and distributed among the US-
American private equity firms, this research is limited to the developed economies. Findings from 
the emerging economies may differ significantly. A longitudinal study involving both developed 
and emerging economies would definitely be of interest. Furthermore, this paper intended to 
make a statement about how actors interpret reality rather than the reality itself. Consequently, a 
different research methodology may be employed to study the relation between perceived and 
actual levels of riskiness of family firm targets. 
Implications for Research 
This is one of the first empirical studies of family firms as acquisition targets that 
analyzed perceptions of private equity professionals. The paper makes several contributions to 
research on family firms. First, it develops the topic mostly overlooked by the family business 
scholars. While succession was traditionally the most prominent and frequently discussed theme, 
alternative succession routes, such as sale, was almost completely ignored. Second, the results 
suggest that major source of lower valuation of family firms is a higher riskiness. A detailed 
study of the sources of family firm specific risks could advance our understanding of the 
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influence of family ownership on firm value. Third, the study highlights the necessity to better 
understand risk-mitigating measures and their relations to different types of risks.  
Findings also have implications for the private equity literature. Most empirical research 
on private equity is in the area of venture capital or public-to-private transactions. This paper 
extents it into the under-represented, yet practically and theoretically important, sphere of buyout 
firms. In addition, it was aimed to contribute to an under-studied area of how private equity 
investors’ perception of the riskiness of potential investee companies influences their valuation 
and investment process. 
Implications for Practice 
Family firms that have a business divestiture on their horizon should implement measures 
aimed at reassuring potential acquirers in a smooth transition to a new ownership. Previous 
research on transfer of the ownership within the family suggested that succession planning 
improved the satisfaction with the succession process of both incumbents and successors (Sharma 
et al., 2003). In addition, planning contributes to success of the succession itself (Smyrnios, 
Romano, & Dana, 2000). Given the findings from the current study and drawing parallels from 
the previous research on the intergenerational family firm transfer, I suggest that a family 
foreseeing a sale of its firm should start planning ahead of time. By doing so, transition to a new 
owner can be made smoother, risks reduced and potentially higher valuation may be realized.  
On the other hand, acquirers need to be aware that family firms form a particular class of 
acquisition targets and act accordingly. Not a single survey participant indicated that she or he 
had no experience with family firms, so familiarity ranged from slightly to extremely familiar. 
Indeed, some of the private equity professionals refused to participate, because they had too little 
or no experience with this type of targets. Accordingly, this study may help professionals who 
deal with family firm targets for the first time to learn from their more experienced peers. 
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GRAPHS 
Graph 1. Risk Types in the Family Firm Acquisition 
Graph 2. Family Firm Valuation in the Acquisition Context 
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Graph 3. Process Length of the Family Firm Acquisition 
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APPENDIX 
Questionnaire 
Do you agree with the following statements? 
   
   
   
Disagree 
Strongly  
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Agree  
Agree 
Strongly  
Family firms are higher risk 
investments        
Family firms earn a higher internal 
rate of return (IRR)          
 
The following risks are HIGHER when you deal with family firm targets as compared to non-family firm 
targets: 
   
   
   
Disagree 
Strongly  
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Agree  
Agree 
Strongly  
Management transition risk   
       
Loss of professional network 
          
Culture transition risk  
          
Risk of hidden facts  
          
Low decision making transparency 
       
Owners back out of transaction  
          
 
Please specify the most important risk connected to investment in family firms.  
 Management transition risk  
 Loss of professional network  
 Culture transition risk  
 Risk of hidden facts  
 Low decision making transparency  
 Owners back out of transaction  
 None of them 
 
Please list any additional risks connected to investments in family firms. 
 
In acquisitions involving family firms, there is more need… 
   
   
   
Disagree 
Strongly  
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Agree  
Agree 
Strongly  
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In acquisitions involving family firms, there is more need… 
   
   
   
Disagree 
Strongly  
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Agree  
Agree 
Strongly  
…to include an earn-out provision  
          
…to leave a minority stake with 
current owners         
…to have an escrow account  
        
…for additional financial due 
diligence        
…for additional legal due diligence  
         
…for additional due diligence on the 
dynamics of the relationships / team         
 
Please list any additional deal clauses or process particularities of investments in family firms. 
 
Why are these contracting details needed? 
 
What is the length of an average investment process in family firms as compared to non-family firms?  
Much Shorter Shorter 
Somewhat 
Shorter 
Same 
Somewhat 
Longer 
Longer Much Longer 
       
 
Imagine two privately-held companies equal in every respect except one is a family firm and the other is not. 
How would you value a family firm target as compared to a non-family firm target?  
Very Large 
Discount 
Large Discount 
Moderate 
Discount 
Neither 
Premium, Nor 
Discount 
Moderate 
Premium 
Large Premium 
Very Large 
Premium 
       
 
Recall the last transaction when you have assigned a discount or a premium to a family firm. What was the 
reason? 
 
As a private equity investor, you achieve the following with the companies you acquire: 
   
   
   
Disagree 
Strongly  
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Agree  
Agree 
Strongly  
Increase business’ transparency 
         
Improve the use of management 
information systems         
Improve organizational structures  
         
Make firm more financially efficient 
(e.g. drive up margins, cost cutting)        
Increase growth rates  
          
Enhance management team with more 
competent members          
Distribute job functions more evenly 
among management         
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As a private equity investor, you achieve the following with the companies you acquire: 
   
   
   
Disagree 
Strongly  
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Agree  
Agree 
Strongly  
Specify contractual restrictions on the 
behavior of remaining managers        
 
Family firm transactions are MORE LIKELY to be turnaround situations than investments in non-family 
firms.  
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Agree Strongly 
       
 
How familiar are you with family firms (includes your experience throughout your career)?  
Not at All Familiar Slightly Familiar Moderately Familiar Very Familiar Extremely Familiar 
     
 
 
